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Comments
BRINGING CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS WITHIN THE SCOPE
OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAWS:
STATUTORY AND FREE EXERCISE ISSUES
I. INTRODUCTION
A major first amendment,1 free exercise conflict has arisen between
Christian schools, 2 which have traditionally enjoyed a minimum of gov-
ernmental interference, 3 and the federal and state employment security
agencies jointly responsible for the administration of the unemployment
compensation laws. 4 Christian schools, rapidly expanding in size and
number, 5 have recently been brought within the scope of the Federal Un-
employment Tax Act (FUTA) 6 by an administrative determination of the
United States Department of Labor. 7 The Labor Department found author-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment, which contains both the free exercise and
establishment clauses, provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Id. (emphasis added). The
first amendment religion clauses have been held to apply to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
2. For a discussion of the characteristics and philosophies of Christian schools, see notes
20-36 and accompanying text infra. Due to the nature of the Supreme Court's analysis in free
exercise cases, the scope of this comment has necessarily been restricted to church schools of a
single religious heritage. The Supreme Court, in evaluating free exercise claims of an aggrieved
religious organization, has traditionally engaged in a particularized inquiry with respect to both
the historical and philosophical characteristics of the organization in question and the potential
effects of governmental action on that organization. See generally notes 259-68 & 281-88 and
accompanying text infra. Because Christian schools have initiated most of the litigation dealing
with the issue raised in this comment, the scope of this discussion has been restricted to Chris-
tian schools.
3. Aside from being required to comply with state statutes relating to school attendance,
length of school year, and health and safety regulations, nonpublic schools in general were not
regulated by the states until the middle of the twentieth century. See generally E. BOLMEIER,
THE SCHOOL IN THE LEGAL STRUCTURE 115-18 (1973); D. ERICKSON, PUBLIC CONTROLS FOR
NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS 103-34 (1969). In fact, private schools were not required by most states to
be approved or accredited until this century. See State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 197-98,
351 N.E.2d 750, 767 (1976). Within the past few years, governmental agencies have attempted
to impose upon religious schools the requirements of 1) making unemployment compensation
contributions, see notes 120-34 and accompanying text infra; 2) complying with the National
Labor Relations Act, see NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979); and 3)
pursuing a nondiscriminatory policy as to students, see note 12 infra.
4. For a discussion of the structure of the unemployment compensation system, see notes
57-67 & 163-74 and accompanying text infra.
5. For a discussion of the recent growth of Christian schools, see notes 20-24 and accom-
panying text infra.
6. I.R.C. §§ 3301-3311. For the amendment to FUTA which, according to the Department
of Labor, brings Christian schools within FUTA's scope, see note 112 and accompanying text
infra.
7. For a discussion of the Labor Department's construction of the pertinent unemployment
compensation laws, see notes 120-34 and accompanying text infra.
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ity for its action in the 1976 amendments to FUTA, s which eliminated the
unemployment compensation tax exemption for primary and secondary
schools. 9
While most recent United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the
first amendment religion clauses' ° have focused on whether state aid to re-
ligious schools violates the establishment clause," the issue raised by the
application of unemployment compensation laws to Christian schools, which
is presently being litigated in the federal and state courts, involves a free
exercise challenge to governmental agency intervention in the practices and
policies of church-related schools. 12 Despite the strong governmental in-
terests involved in extending unemployment compensation coverage to
employees of nonpublic schools, 13 there are substantial indications that sub-
jecting Christian schools to unemployment taxation is neither statutorily
mandated 14 nor constitutionally permissible. 15
This comment will review the goals, background, and nature both of the
Christian schools and of the unemployment compensation statutes. Relying
upon the recent Supreme Court decision of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 16 and a close interpretation of the relevant FUTA provisions, it will
8. See Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, 90 Stat.
2667.
9. See notes 108-12 and accompanying text infra.
10. For the relevant provisions of the first amendment, see note 1 supra.
11. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
12. In addition to the unemployment compensation issue addressed by this comment, three
other free exercise issues involving government agencies and religious schools are currently
garnering attention. First, many Christian schools have refused to comply with state approval
and accreditation requirements, resulting in the states attempting to close the schools and pros-
ecute parents for causing their children to be truant. See Hinton v. Kentucky St. Bd. of Educ.,
No. 88314 (Franklin Cir. Ct., filed Oct. 4, 1978); North Carolina v. Columbus Christian Acad.,
No. 78 CVS 1678 (Super. Ct. Div., Wake County, N.C. Sept. 1, 1978); State v. Whisner, 47
Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976). Second, a recently proposed I.R.S. revenue proceed-
ing provides for a mechanism whereby religious and other private schools which fail to maintain
specified nondiscriminatory policies will lose their tax exempt status. See 44 Fed. Reg. 9451-
9455 (1979); 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296-37,298 (1978). Congress has subsequently denied funding for
this proposed mechanism for the current fiscal year. Treasury, Postal Service, and General
Government Appropriation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, tit. VI, § 615, 93 Stat. 559, 577
(1979).
The third area of conflict between religious schools and a governmental agency has been
recently resolved by the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979). The Court held that the National Labor Relations Board lacked authority
to order parochial schools to engage in collective bargaining with lay teachers' unions. Id. at
1322. For a discussion of the parochial school labor cases, see notes 297-308 and accompanying
text infra.
13. For a discussion of the governmental interests involved in unemployment compensation,
see notes 50-56 and accompanying text infra.
14. Regarding the lack of statutory grounds for subjecting Christian schools to unemploy-
ment compensation taxation, see notes 174-252 and accompanying text infra.
15. For a discussion of the constitutionality of the application of the unemployment compen-
sation statutes to Christian schools, see notes 310-69 and accompanying text infra.
16. 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979).
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be suggested that the Labor Department's determination to bring Christian
schools within the scope of FUTA is not consistent with the statute or Con-
gressional intent. 17  Finally, this comment will suggest that in light of
the three-tiered analysis of free exercise rights developed by the Supreme
Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder,"' treating Christian schools as "employers" for
purposes of the unemployment compensation laws violates the first amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. 19
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Christian School Phenomenon
The startling growth of Christian schools in the past decade has at-
tracted nationwide attention. 20  It is estimated that there are presently
20,000 Protestant-related schools in the United States, 2 1 of which about
1,500 were formed in September, 1978.22 New Christian schools are being
formed at the approximate rate of two per day.23 In the past decade, pupil
enrollment in certain regional associations of Christian schools has increased
over 700%.24
Due to the independent nature 2 5 of most Christian schools, no one de-
scription is capable of encompassing them all. Some are owned and operated
by churches, while others are independently incorporated.2 6 However, two
valid generalizations may be made about these schools: 1) they subscribe to a
17. See notes 175-252 and accompanying text infra.
18. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For a discussion of Yoder's three-tiered inquiry see notes 261-91
and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 254-369 and accompanying text infra.
20. See THE NAT'L OBSERVER, Jan. 15, 1977, at 1; U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Aug. 18,
1975, at 50; U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Oct. 8, 1975, at 44; The Philadelphia Bulletin, Jan.
8, 1979, at 1, col. 8. ABC news commentator, Paul Harvey, has stated:
Christian schools predate public schools in the United States by 200 years. These are not
"parochial" schools. They are supported in whole or in part by a church, but each is open
to anybody who is academically qualified and willing to live and work by the rules.
Christian schools are the fastest growing education movement in America.
P. KIENEL, AMERICA NEEDS BIBLE CENTERED FAMILIES AND SCHOOLS 96 (1971).
21. The Philadelphia Bulletin, Jan. 8, 1979, at 1, col. 8.
22. Id.
23. THE NAT'L OBSERVER, Jan. 15, 1977, at 1.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. There are a substantial minority of separately incorporated Christian schools not owned
or operated by a single church or association of churches. Such schools are often incorporated
by parents, operated by a Board of Trustees, and owned by a nonprofit society of contributing
parents and friends of the school. Many such schools are incorporated pursuant to a charter
containing a statement of specific doctrines mutually convenanted to by all parents, teachers,
administrators, and society members. This doctrinal statement may or may not be patterned
after that of an established denomination; consequently, a Christian school may be comprised of
individuals attending many different local churches while sharing common fundamental doc-
trines.
Church operated and separately incorporated schools do not necessarily differ substantially
in their beliefs, practices, or curriculum. In fact, the individuals involved in separately incorpo-
COMMENT
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strict, literal interpretation of the Bible and integrate its teachings into all
areas of education; 27 and 2) they hold as a fundamental doctrine the neces-
sity of personal faith in Christ's death and resurrection as the means of salva-
tion. 
28
The primary reason most Christian schools exist, according to many ob-
servers, is to apply Scriptural principles in the classroom in a fashion which
is now impermissible in the public schools. 29  Some analysts, however, have
asserted that the primary reason for the expansion of Christian schools is the
desire to create racially segregated "enclaves" of education. 30 While there
are undoubtedly some nominally religious schools operated primarily to pro-
vide racially segregated education under a religious cover,3 1 many Christian
schools have voluntarily achieved substantial racial integration. 32
The dramatic increase in the size and number of Christian schools has
been paralleled by a growing tendency on the part of governmental agencies
to subject Christian schools to regulation,3 3 taxation, 34 and investigation.3 5
This increased governmental intervention has generated cases in state and
federal courts litigating the competing interests of the government and the
schools.
3 6
B. An Overview of Unemployment Compensation Legislation
The impetus for the passage of unemployment compensation legislation
was provided by the unprecedented levels of unemployment which existed
rated Christian schools often display many characteristics of a church, in that they meet regu-
larly to engage in worship, Christian education, prayer, and fellowship. The primary difference
between church schools and separately incorporated schools is the structure of their organiza-
tions. Unlike church-related schools, the administration of a separately incorporated school is
not under the direct authority of any local church; separately incorporated schools are not con-
ducted on church property and are not funded by a church. See generally DELAWARE COUNTY
CHRISTIAN SCHOOL, HANDBOOK FOR BOARD MEMBERS 3-32 (Aug. 1979) (unpublished pamph-
let on file at the VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW office).
27. See The Philadelphia Bulletin, Jan. 8, 1979, at 1, col. 8.
28. See id.
29. See THE NAT'L OBSERVER, Jan. 15, 1977, at 1, 18. For a presentation of the philosophi-
cal background and method of operation of Christian schools, see P. KIENEL, THE PHILOSOPHY
OF CHRISTIAN SCHOOL EDUCATION (1978).
30. See Rowan, Schools That Give Religion a "Bad Name," The Philadelphia Bulletin, Jan.
9, 1979, at 7, col. 1.
31. Id.
32. See U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Oct. 8, 1973, at 45; The Philadelphia Bulletin, Jan.
8, 1979, at 3, col. 1.
33. See notes 3 & 12 supra. For a discussion of the aspects of the unemployment compensa-
tion laws considered by Christian schools to be particularly burdensome, see notes 72-107 and
accompanying text infra.
34. See notes 3 & 12 supra. Regarding the tax elements of the unemployment compensation
laws, see notes 72-87 and accompanying text infra.
35. Under the unemployment compensation statutes, the federal and state governments
have substantial powers to investigate the everyday financial matters of employers within their
jurisdiction. See notes 88-95 and accompanying text infra.
36. Regarding cases which have arisen under the unemployment compensation laws, see
notes 137-54 and accompanying text infra. For other cases initiated by Christian schools against
governmental agencies, see note 12 supra.
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during the Great Depression. 37 The economic privation experienced by the
unemployed during the early 1930's went largely unremedied due to the
nonexistence of state or federal unemployment compensation programs. 38
The state legislatures, however, were reluctant to pass comprehensive mea-
sures to alleviate the hardships of unemployment. 39 This reluctance stemmed
primarily from the legislatures' fear that requiring businesses within
their states to pay unemployment taxes would subject those businesses to a
competitive disadvantage with the businesses of other states having no such
plan. 40 Congress, in passing the Social Security Act of 1935 (Act),4 ' effec-
tively eliminated this concern and encouraged states to adopt their own un-
employment compensation statutes. 42  Titles 11143 and IX 44 of that Act
levied an unemployment wage tax on all covered employers, 45 but credited
against this federal tax liability most of the employers' contributions to cer-
37. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES,
COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 135 (Bicentennial ed. 1975). The average rate of unemployment in
the United States rose from 3.2% in 1929 to 15.9% in 1931. Id. The percentage of unemploy-
ment remained above 15% for 8 years, reaching the highest figure in the nation's history-
24.9%-in 1933. Id.
38. Lacking sufficient machinery to cope with such massive social upheavals, the federal and
state governments were incapable of ameliorating the tremendous financial hardships experi-
enced by millions of idled workers. See Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation,
55 YALE L.J. 21, 25-28 (1945).
39. See H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935) (report of Ways and Means
Committee accompanying Social Security Act of 1935); Witte, supra note 38, at 28.
40. H.R. REP. No. 615, supra note 39, at 5. The Ways and Means Committee report which
accompanied the Social Security Act of 1935 provided in pertinent part:
The failure of the States to enact unemployment insurance laws is due largely to the
fact that to do so would handicap their industries in competition with the industries of
other States. The States have been unwilling to place this extra financial burden upon
their industries. A uniform, Nation-wide tax upon industry, thus removing the principal
obstacle in the way of unemployment insurance, is necessary before the States can go
ahead. Such a tax would make it possible for the States to enact this socially desirable
legislation.
Id.
41. Pub. L. No. 271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (1976)).
42. See Witte, supra note 38, at 32.
43. Pub. L. No. 271, tit. III, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504, 1101-
1108, 1321-1324 (1976). Title III was designated "Grants to States for Unemployment Compen-
sation Administration." 49 Stat. at 626.
44. Pub. L. No. 271, tit. IX, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (now I.R.C. §§ 3301-3311), Title IX was
designated "Tax on Employers of Eight or More." 49 Stat. at 639. Four years after the passage
of the Social Security Act, Title IX was reenacted as the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 9, subch. C, §§ 1600-1610, 53 Stat. 183-88 (now I.R.C. §§ 3301-3311).
The federal unemployment tax was designed to raise revenue to cover only administrative ex-
penses of both the federal and state programs; Congress intended the states to actually disburse
the benefits out of their own funds financed by state unemployment taxes. See Witte, supra
note 38, at 32.
45. For an explanation of which employers are covered by the Act, see note 50 infra. The
original rate of tax established by Title IX of the Social Security Act was 1% of the total wages
paid by a covered employer. Pub. L. No. 271, tit. IX, § 901(1), 49 Stat. 639 (1935). The present
rate of tax is 3.2%. See I.R.C. § 3301.
1979-1980]
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tified 4 6 state unemployment funds. 47  As a result of the Act's nationwide
application,48 every state had enacted its own unemployment legislation by
1937.
4 9
The history of the unemployment compensation system has been one of
steadily increasing coverage, not only with respect to the types and number
of employees protected, 50 but also in terms of the amount 51 and duration 52
of benefits received. This expansion is largely attributable to the strong gov-
ernmental policies and interests which tend to be furthered by the system,
including the objectives of 1) alleviating the economic privation of the un-
employed; 53 2) encouraging and accelerating the process of obtaining new
employment by assisting the unemployed in the interim period between
46. For a discussion of the certification process, see notes 61-65 and accompanying text
infra.
47. The original Act provided that up to 90% of the payments made into an approved state
unemployment compensation fund could be credited against the 1.0% wage excise tax. Pub. L.
No. 271, tit. IX, § 902, 49 Stat. 640 (1935). The present Act still credits 90% of the state
payments against the FUTA tax. I.R.C. § 3302(c).
48. Regarding FUTA's provision whereby contributions made into a certified state fund are
credited against the FUTA tax, see note 46 and accompanying text supra.
49. Witte, supra note 38, at 34. In 1932, Wisconsin became the first state to enact a suc-
cessful employment insurance law. Id. at 26. Six other states enacted unemployment legislation
in the same year the Social Security Act of 1935 was approved. Id. at 33. By the end of 1937,
all states had enacted similar legislation. Id. at 34.
50. The original FUTA applied only to private, profit-making employers who employed
eight or more individuals. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 271, tit. IX, § 907(a), (c), 49
Stat. 642-43 (1935). In 1954, coverage was extended to employers of four or more employees,
and to certain federal employees. Act to Extend and Improve the Unemployment Compensation
Program, Pub. L. No. 767, §§ 1, 4, 68 Stat. 1130 (1954). The Employment Security Amend-
ments of 1970 further extended coverage to employers of only one employee, Employment
Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 101, 84 Stat. 696, and to nonprofit or-
ganizations, state hospitals, and institutions of higher education. Pub. L. No. 91-373, Part A,
§§ 101, 104, 84 Stat. 696-97. Most recently in 1976, FUTA was amended to require states to cover
public and many private schools, certain governmental organizations, and specified agricultural
and domestic employees. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-566, Part I, §§ 101, 112, 113, 90 Stat. 2670. With respect to the 1976 amendments, the
Secretary of Labor has stated: "These amendments were designed to provide coverage under
the permanent Federal-State Unemployment Compensation Program for substantially all the
nation's wage and salary earners .... United States Dep't of Labor v. Alabama Dep't of In-
dus. Relat., slip op. at 5 (Conformity Proceeding, Decision of the Secretary of Labor, Oct. 31,
1979) [hereinafter cited as Conformity Proceeding-Decision of the Secretary].
51. See Larson & Murray, The Development of Unemployment Insurance in the United
States, 8 VAND. L. REV. 181, 196-98, 200-02 (1955); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAws 3-35 to 3-37 (1979).
52. See Larson & Murray, supra note 51, at 196-98, 202; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note
51, at 3-35 to 3-37.
53. See S. BLAUSTEIN, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES 5-12 (1968).
Under the broad policy of providing assistance to individual workers during unemployment,
Blaustein defines three subordinate objectives: 1) to assure workers of financial support in a
dignified, orderly, and reliable manner during periods of involuntary unemployment; 2) to en-
able the unemployed worker to maintain his standard of living by adequately replacing his lost
wages; and 3) to help the unemployed worker to sustain his earning capacity and take full
advantage of the skills and experience gained in previous employment and training. Id. at 6-7.
[ OL. 25: p. 69
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jobs;54 and 3) strengthening the overall economy and preventing additional
unemployment through the achievement of the first two objectives. 55  Be-
cause the system has been remarkably successful in furthering these gov-
ernmental interests, 56 attempts to expand its coverage have, until recently,
met little resistance.
As the scope of unemployment compensation coverage expanded, 57 it
also developed into a complex federal-state system, 58 under which the fed-
eral government has increasingly dictated 59 how the state statutes must be
structured. 60  The mechanism that enables Congress to maintain a substan-
tial measure of state compliance with the federal statute is FUTA's certifica-
54. Id. at 8-9. Blaustein has discerned three objectives under the policy of "improving man-
power utilization": 1) to encourage or maintain the unemployed worker's incentive to work; 2) to
expose unemployed workers to job opportunities; and 3) to enhance the employment potential
of unemployed workers. Id.
55. Id. at 11-12. Under the policy of "general economic stability," Blaustein has found two
specific objectives: 1) to counter the deflationary effects of unemployment on the economy; and
2) to preserve flexibility and freedom of choice for private and public economic policy. Id.
56. See The Administration Proposal to Amend the Federal Unemployment Compensation
Statutes: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969)
(Statement of President Richard M. Nixon); Phase III: Proposed Changes in the Permanent
Federal-State Unemployment Compensation Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Un-
employment Compensation of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., ist Sess. 2-3
(1975) (Statement of James Corman) [hereinafter cited as Phase III, 1975 Hearings].
57. Congress designed the American unemployment compensation system to be a program
of employment insurance funded by employers. Bernstein, Foreward to the Illinois Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, at IX (Smith-Hurd 1966). Only a portion of
the economic hardship caused by unemployment is alleviated by unemployment legislation,
however, because state unemployment laws generally limit coverage in three respects: 1) ben-
efits amount to only a percentage of a worker's normal salary; 2) eligibility for benefits is
predicated on both a qualification period of employment and a waiting period; and 3) ordinary
benefits are limited in duration. Larson & Murray, supra note 51, at 196-204. Unlike more
generalized relief measures, the unemployment compensation system was intended to provide
an idled worker with a partial, temporary shield against economic hardship in order to facilitate
his acquisition of new employment. See E. WITTE, THE ESSENTIALS OF UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION 157, 159-60 (1936).
Unemployment compensation should be distinguished from other forms of governmental
assistance. Unlike welfare payments, the benefits under unemployment compensation 1) are
provided to unemployed workers as a matter of right under predetermined standards; 2) are not
subject to modification in amount by the exercise of official discretion; 3) are limited to the
involuntarily unemployed who, for a certain time prior to unemployment, were in some way
attached to the labor market; 4) have a statutorily limited duration; and 5) are paid out of a
separate fund financed by payroll taxes. Burns, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-
Economic Objectives, 55 YALE L.J. 1, 2-4 (1945).
58. Larson & Murray, supra note 51, at 206-11. For examples of representative state un-
employment compensation acts, see 65 CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 1-2113 (West 1972); 15
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 443.01-24 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 48, §§ 300-820 (Smith-Hurd
1966); 20 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 421.1-501 (1978); 41 OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4141.01-.99 (Page 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 751-914 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1979-80).
For a comparison of all 50 state unemployment compensation laws, see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
supra note 51.
59. See Witte, supra note 38, at 32.
60. Under Title IX of the Social Security Act of 1935, the original version of FUTA, a state
statute was required to comply with only six broad provisions for certification. See Pub. L. No.
271, tit. IX, § 903(a), 49 Stat. 626 (now I.R.C. , 3304). The present FUTA has 17 detailed
COMMENT
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tion process. 61  Under this process, each state's employment statute is re-
viewed annually by the Secretary of Labor. 62  States found to comply with
the criteria set forth in FUTA are approved 63 and thereafter certified by the
Secretary. 64  Since only payments made into a certified state fund entitle
the payor to a reduction of his FUTA liability, 65 the state legislatures are
provided strong incentive to conform their statutes to new FUTA require-
ments.6 6 Indeed, in many cases, state adoption of new FUTA requirements
has become automatic. 67
provisions setting forth the state statute certification prerequisites, I.R.C. § 3304, 16 defined
terms, id. § 3306, including 17 subsections under the term "employment," id. § 3306(c), and a
new section entitled "State Law Coverage of Services Performed for Nonprofit Organizations or
Governmental Entities." Id. § 3309.
61. The original statutory provisions setting forth the certification process were contained in
the Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 271, tit. IX, § 903, 49 Stat. 620 (now I.R.C.
9 3304).
62. I.R.C. § 3304(c).
63. Id. 9 3304(a).
64. Id. 9 3304(c).65. Id. 93302(a)(1).
66. Failure by a state to obtain certification of its statute would theoretically result in serious
consequences to the state's economy. Since all businesses are required to pay the 3.2% FUTA
tax to the federal government unless they receive credit for making payment into a certified
state plan, I.R.C. § 3302, revocation of a state statute's certification would eliminate the credit
and reinstitute full liability for the FUTA tax. Id. In a state where certification has been re-
fused, an employer would be paying the full amount of the FUTA tax, or 3.2% of all wages, id.
§ 3301, and the full amount of the state employment security tax, which may range as high as
2.7%. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 781(a)(1) (Purdon 1964). The cumulative percentage
of wages paid in such a situation would be 5.9%, which is an amount significantly in excess of
the present unemployment tax liability of employers in every other American jurisdiction. See
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 51, at 2-39 to 2-40.
No state statute has failed to be certified for any extended period of time. Larson & Mur-
ray, supra note 51, at 208-10. The extreme complications which would result from noncertifica-
tion have led the Secretary of Labor and noncomplying states to seek other means, such as
negotiations, to resolve problems of conformity. Id. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 503-04 (1976) (providing a
hearing and appeal process whereby a non-certified state may contest its designation of noncon-
formity prior to revocation of the FUTA tax credit).
67. Some states adopt provisions required under FUTA in a form that is identical with the
Federal Act. Compare, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 3309(b)(1), (2) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 7 53(1)(4)(8)(a), (b) (Purdon Supp. 1979). The legislative history of recent amendments to FUTA
indicates that Congress considers state adoption of the new FUTA provisions to be mandatory.
See S. REP. No. 1265, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5997. This Senate Report provided:
The Committee on Finance, to which was referred [this] bill to require States to extend
unemployment compensation coverage to certain previously uncovered workers; to in-
crease the amount of the wages subject to the Federal unemployment tax; to increase the
rate of such tax; and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably
thereon with amendments and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
Id. (emphasis added). One observer has stated that
with notable exceptions, state coverage is shaped to conform with federal law. In this
matter, indeed, federal leadership is so far accepted that the charge of federal "dictation"
has not, as it has in other aspects of unemployment compensation, prevented some ex-
pansion of the system by federal initiative. . . . A majority of states have . . . copied th[e]
federal exclusions . . . substantially verbatim.
Willcox, The Coverage of Unemployment Compensation Laws, 8 VAND. L. REV. 245 (1955).
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C. The Relevant Statutory Provisions
Several aspects of the federal-state program of unemployment compen-
sation are having a direct and significant impact on the day-to-day operations
of church-related schools. Of special concern to these schools is the fact that
the unemployment laws: 1) require Christian schools to elect between con-
tribution 6s and reimbursement 69 modes of liability and to make unemploy-
ment tax payments according to the method they choose; 2) necessitate the
keeping of records, the filing of reports, and the payment of penalties in the
event of noncompliance with the laws; 70 and 3) may result in the schools
being forced to contest the liability evaluations made by state employment
agencies regarding the validity of employment termination. 71
1. Types of Employer Liability
Most employers are required by state laws to make periodic tax pay-
ments or "contributions" into their state's unemployment compensation
fund. 72 The frequency and amount of an employer's contributions are de-
termined by the state administrative agency in accordance with both federal
and state law. 73 One technique utilized by every state to determine the
contribution rate of particular employers is "experience rating"--a system
which triggers variations in an employer's contribution rate based on the
amount of benefits previously paid to the former employees of that
employer. 74  However, because employers are required to make contribu-
tions over fixed intervals at predetermined rates, 75 the unemployment com-
pensation laws do not assure that the state fund will receive exact reim-
bursement from a given employer for the amount of benefits received by
that employer's idled workers. 76  Hence, unemployment compensation func-
tions in a manner similar to employer-bought unemployment insurance in
that the amount of benefits actually received by the unemployed of a given
68. For an explanation of the contribution mode of employer liability, see notes 72-77 and
accompanying text infra.
69. For an explanation of the reimbursement mode of employer liability, see notes 78-87
and accompanying text infra.
70. See notes 88-100 and accompanying text infra.
71. See notes 101-07 and accompanying text infra.
72. See generally Larson & Murray, supra note 51.
73. See id. See also I.R.C. § 3302(a)(1).
74. I.R.C. § 3302(a)(1). See also Witte, supra note 38, at 32, 34-43.
75. Eberling, Financing of Benefits in Unemployment Insurance, 17 VAND. L. REv. 759,
760 (1964). If an employer's state contribution rate is diminished by "experience rating," it is
entitled to a corresponding credit against its FUTA tax liability. I.R.C. § 3302(b). For Pennsyl-
vania's experience factor provision, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 781.1(a), (d) (Purdon Supp.
1979). Under Pennsylvania's experience rating system, an employer's rate of contributions may
vary from 0.3% to 4.0% of the wages paid. Id. at § 781.1(a). For a general discussion of experi-
ence rating, see Clagre, The Economics of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 53,
57-64 (1945); Palomba, Experience Rating: A 30-Year Controversy, 19 LAB. L.J. 28 (1968).
76. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 781(e) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
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organization may differ substantially from the amount the organization previ-
ously paid into the fund. 7 7
In lieu of utilizing the standard contribution mode of determining liabil-
ity under state unemployment statutes, nonprofit organizations, such as
church schools, are permitted under FUTA to elect the "reimbursement
method" for determining tax liability. 78 Under this method, an employer is
required to pay into the state fund the exact amount of benefits received by
the unemployed of that organization. 79  In contrast to the standard method,
payments under the election provisions are, in effect, reimbursements made
after the benefit period.8 0
The reimbursement mode of computing liability provides several advan-
tages for nonprofit institutions. First, it enables organizations to avoid mak-
ing contributions as long as their former employees do not receive un-
employment compensation benefits. 8 1 Second, until reimbursements are
necessitated, it allows a nonprofit organization to retain and collect interest
on funds which would otherwise have been payable as contributions.8 2  Fi-
nally, it tends to assure that the nonprofit organization's funds, which are
often derived from charitable contributions, will assist the organization's own
unemployed rather than the unemployed of the state in general.8 3
77. See PA. DEP'T OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY, REIMBURSEMENT? OR CONTRIBUTION? YOUR
BEST METHOD OF COVERAGE FOR MANDATORY UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 4 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as REIMBURSEMENT OR CONTRIBUTION].
78. See Note, Charity Versus Social Insurance in Unemployment Compensation Laws, 73
YALE L.J. 357, 359 (1963).
79. See I.R.C. §§ 3303(e)(3), 3309(a)(2).
80. Id. § 3309(a)(2). The federal statute describes reimbursement payments under this elec-
tion system as being in "amounts equal to the amounts of compensation attributable [to the
unemployed of the nonprofit organization]." Id. (emphasis added). A pamphlet published by the
Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, describing the reimbursement method, states
that a "nonprofit employer must pay back to the State [Unemployment Compensation] Fund on
a dollar-for-dollar basis, all claims and other charges made to his/her account." REIMBURSEMENT
OR CONTRIBUTION, supra note 77, at 5.
Pennsylvania's reimbursement election system is illustrative of the systems which states
have provided for nonprofit organizations. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 901-910 (Purdon
Supp. 1979). A Pennsylvania nonprofit organization exercises its election by filing a written
notice within 30 days immediately following the date it comes within the general requirements
of the Act, id. § 905(b), or 30 days prior to the beginning of any taxable year. Id. § 905(c). The
nonprofit organization is then required to reimburse the state on a quarterly basis for all ben-
efits paid to the organization's unemployed. Id. § 906(a).
81. See REIMBURSEMENT OR CONTRIBUTION, supra note 77, at 5. The attractiveness of the
election method is enhanced in some states, such as Pennsylvania, which provide for group
accounts under which two or more nonprofit organizations agree to share the cost of reim-
bursement made to the state unemployment fund for benefits paid to their employed. See, e.g.,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 909 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
82. See REIMBURSEMENT OR CONTRIBUTION, supra note 77, at 4.
83. The Senate Report accompanying the Employment Security Amendments of 1970 pro-
vided in pertinent part:
The States would be required also to provide nonprofit organizations with the option of
reimbursing the State for unemployment compensation payments attributable to service
with the organization in lieu of paying contributions under the normal tax provisions of
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There are, however, disadvantages to the election provisions which may
tend to outweigh the advantages of the system.8 4 For instance, some un-
employment agencies have interpreted the election provisions to mean that a
"reimbursable employer cannot file for relief from charges in cases where
an error has been made or in cases where [benefits are] being paid to some-
one who left their employ without good cause and is subsequently hired and
laid off by another employer within the same 4 to 5 quarter period."
85
Also, since the reimbursement method offers little of the predictability of
the contribution method, organizations must provide sufficient cash reserves
to meet a wide range of potential liability.86 Finally, it has been observed
that "a massive layoff for whatever reason would have catastrophic effects on
reimbursable employers since they will be liable, dollar-for-dollar, for every
claim made against their account." 87
2. Means of Assuring Compliance
Another provision of the unemployment compensation laws which has a
significant impact on the routine affairs of church-related schools is the re-
quirement that covered employers maintain and submit to the state detailed
records of their operations. 8 These records facilitate state administration of
the State law. In effect, the nonprofit organizations would be allowed to adopt a form of
self-insurance. Under the reimbursement method of financing, a nonprofit organization
whose workers experience no compensated unemployment in a year would have no un-
employment insurance costs for that year. The committee considers it appropriate that
these organizations, which are often dependent upon charitable contributions, should not
be required to share in the costs of providing benefits to workers in profit-making enter-
prises
S. REP. No. 752, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3606, 3618 (emphasis added).
One of the few cases construing the reimbursement election provision is Wilmington Medi-
cal Center v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 346 A.2d 181 (Del. Super. 1975). The Wilmington
court stated:
It appears that the intent of Congress in enacting the reimbursement method of financing
was to enable nonprofit organizations to escape the burden of contributing greater
amounts to the Unemployment Compensation Fund than the costs which were incurred
directly by elections of the nonprofit organizations in a given year. This was seen by the
Senate as desirable public policy in light of the charitable nature of such organizations.
Id. at 183.
84. REIMBURSEMENT OR CONTRIBUTION; supra note 77, at 6.
85. See id. But see Wilmington Medical Center v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 346
A.2d 181 (Del. Super. 1975) (holding that a nonprofit employer would not be liable for any
amount of reimbursement where an employee left his job without good cause and was sub-
sequently hired and fired by another employer).
86. See REIMBURSEMENT OR CONTRIBUTION, supra note 77, at 6, 7.
87. Id. at 7. The quoted language indicates a recognition that electing to make reimburse-
ments could, under severe circumstances, result in the insolvency and eventual demise of a
nonprofit organization. The Pennsylvania Department of Labor provided a telling example of
this potential for staggering liability: an organization, laying off 10 employees who thereafter
draw the maximum benefit rate for 30 weeks, would be liable for a reimbursement of $42,000 in
one year. Id. at 5.
88. See generally 65 CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1085 (West Supp. 1979); 15 FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 443.12(7), . 15(2)(a) (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 630-40 (Smith-Hurd 1966);
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the laws 8 9 and provide the Labor Department with statistical data used to
analyze national employment trends. 90
The Pennsylvania statute, for instance, requires employers to file re-
ports with the state 9 l and maintain records open for inspection92 that set
forth the wages paid to each employee 93 and other information necessary to
compute the organization's tax liability. 94 In addition, the Pennsylvania
Department of Labor and Industry has promulgated regulations requiring
employers to retain, for four years, other records "such as cashbooks, jour-
nals, ledgers, and corporate minutes" in a central place for department in-
spection purposes. 95 Moreover, FUTA allows states that utilize the re-
imbursement method 96 to "provide safeguards to ensure that [nonprofit
organizations] so electing will make the payments required under such elec-
tions."97 Pennsylvania has provided two types of safeguards to ensure pay-
ments by electing nonprofit organizations: 1) the posting of a surety bond to
insure compliance with the elective provisions; 98 and 2) post-violation sanc-
tions in the form of interest and penalties. 99 Pennsylvania has also adopted
separate sanctions for employers who fail to keep records in conformity with
20 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 421.11(b) (1978); N.Y. LAB. LAw § 575 (McKinney 1977); 41
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.18 (Page 1973); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5221b-9(a)
(Vernon 1962).
89. These reports are used to determine the existence and the extent of an employer's
unemployment tax liability. See statutory provisions cited note 88 supra.
90. See Phase 111, 1975 Hearings, supra note 56, at 259-388 (statement of Christopher Jehn,
Public Research Institute of the Center of Naval Analysis).
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 766, 784 (Purdon 1964). Regarding the specific reports to be
filed by a Pennsylvania employer, see 34 PA. CODE §§ 63.51-.56. Each employer in Pennsyl-
vania is required to keep "clear, accurate, and complete employment and payroll records,"
including the full name, social security account number and wage rate of each employee. Id.
§ 63.64. Beyond these minimal requirements, the employer is also obligated to keep business
records, such as cash books, journals, ledgers, and corporate minutes, for four years in order to
provide the Bureau of Employment Security with intbrmation on each employee concerning 1)
the total remuneration paid according to type of payment; 2) the amounts and dates of traveling
and other business expenses incurred by the employee and reimbursed by the employer; 3)
place of employment; 4) full-time scheduled hours; 5) a daily attendance record, showing the
dates on which the employee actually worked and the time lost due to reasons other than lack
of work; and 6) if separated, the date and the reasons for separation. Id.
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 766 (Purdon 1964). The Pennsylvania statute requires the
records to be open for inspection at "any reasonable time, and as often as may be deemed
necessary." Id.
93. Id. §§ 766, 784(a) (Purdon 1964).
94. Id. § 766.
95. 34 PA. CODE § 63.64.
96. For an explanation of the reimbursement mode of unemployment compensation pay-
ments, see notes 78-87 and accompanying text supra.
97. See I.R.C. § 3309(a)(2).
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 906(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979). The bond is set at 1% of the
organization's taxable wages for the four most recent calendar quarters prior to the election of
reimbursements. Id.
99. Id. § 906(c). Overdue reimbursement payments are subject to penalties of one to five
dollars per reporting period, id. § 766, and interest at the rate of 1% per month from the date
they become due until the date they are paid. Id. § 788.
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the regulations adopted by the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and In-
dustry. 00
3. Determinations of Eligibility for Benefits
The third aspect of the federal-state unemployment program having a
noteworthy impact on church-related schools is the system whereby the state
employment agencies analyze the reasons for the termination of a worker's
employment in order to ascertain the employer's tax liability. These agency
determinations are a prolific source of litigation, 10 1 since every decision ad-
versely affects either the employer's tax liability or the employee's entitle-
ment to benefits. It is well-settled in most states that an employee is entitled
to benefits if he was laid off due to forces outside his control, such as plant
shutdowns or work shortages; 102 however, the worker clearly has no right to
benefits if he quit for purely personal reasons 103 or was fired for gross mis-
conduct. 1104 The reason for most of the litigation in this area ' 0 5 is the vague-
ness of the statutory "good cause" standard 1 0 6 used to determine whether
100. Id. § 766. A failure on the part of an employer to file or complete in satisfactory manner
a periodic report showing the amount of his contribution or wage payments results in a nominal
penalty of one to five dollars per reporting period. Id.
101. See generally Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 1129 (1971); Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d 1356 (1967); An-
not., 89 A.L.R.2d 1089 (1963); Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 1158 (1955).
102. See Harrison, Statutory Purpose and Involuntary Unemployment, 55 YALE L.J. 117
(1945).
103. For a discussion of when the voluntary termination of one's employment constitutes a
valid ground for the denial of benefits, see Kempfer, Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving
and Misconduct, 55 YALE L.J. 147, 154-59 (1945).
104. For a discussion of when misconduct constitutes a ground for the denial of benefits, see
id. at 160-66.
105. Various jurisdictions have taken divergent positions on whether, under a given factual
situation, an employee is entitled to benefits. With respect to acts or threats of physical violence
as grounds for the denial of benefits, compare Carter v. Michigan Employment Secur. Comm'n,
364 Mich. 538, 111 N.W.2d 817 (1961) (denying benefits to employee who threatened to punch
employer in the nose) and Hunt v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 197 Pa. Super. Ct.
435, 180 A.2d 108 (1962) (barring award where employee made threatening remarks and baited
the employer to fight) with Guest v. Administrator, Unemployment Comp. Act, 22 Conn. Supp.
458, 174 A.2d 545 (1961) (benefits awarded even though employee was fired for striking super-
visor) and Gatlin v. .Brown, 154 So. 2d 224 (La. App. 1963) (allowing award where employee
was charged with damaging company property and endangering a foreman's safety in the opera-
tion of a motor vehicle). With respect to the sufficiency of profane language or backtalk as a
ground for the denial of benefits, compare Gilbert Co. v. Kordorsky, 134 Conn. 209, 56 A.2d
169 (1947) (benefits denied where employee loudly told his superiors that his employer was
"'gypping" him) and Jackson v. Brown, 136 So. 2d 329 (La. App. 1961) (barring award where
employee told her foreman, using abusive and profane language, that she would leave her work
whenever she desired) with Martino v. Administrator, Unemployment Comp. Act, 20 Conn.
Supp. 394, 136 A.2d 810 (1957) (allowing award where employee cursed at his employer) and
Kimble v. Brown, 162 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 1964) (allowing award where employee accused his
employer of laziness).
106. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 51, at 4-27, 4-28, table 401. For a discussion of
the "good cause" standard, see Davidson, Unemployment Insurance: Good Cause for Leaving
Employment, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 597 (1971). See also cases cited note 105 supra.
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an employer or employee was justified in deciding to terminate the
employment relationship.
10 7
D. The 1976 Amendments to the Unemployment Compensation Laws
1. Background and Effect of the Amendments
Before 1976, all public, private, and religious schools were granted a
blanket exclusion from the requirements of unemployment compensation
legislation under section 3309(b)(3) of FUTA.' 0 8  Due to the high levels of
employment traditionally enjoyed by the teaching profession, 10 9 little im-
petus existed to eliminate this exclusion. However, unemployment among
teachers increased dramatically in the early 1970's,110 and, in 1976, Congress
responded to the request of public school teachers' unions " by eliminating
107. See Davidson, supra note 106, at 597-602. The law in the area of eligibility has changed
significantly since the inception of unemployment compensation. Under the older versions of
FUTA, eligibility was contingent upon a finding that the prevailing economic climate, and not
the employee, was primarily responsible for his unemployment. As one early court stated:
Clearly the Unemployment Tax Act was intended to care for periods of economic stress
when workers, through no fault of their own were unable to find employment. It was
intended . . . to take care of those whose enforced lack of employment entailed financial
loss and whose personal resources were insufficient for a proper standard of living.
Personal Finance Co. of Braddock v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 779, 786 (D. Del. 1949)
(emphasis added). In stark contrast to the classic view of benefit eligibility is the reasoning of a
recent California case, Jacobs v. California Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1035,
102 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1972), wherein the discharge of an alcoholic employee for recurring absen-
teeism caused by chronic intoxication was not found to be adequate cause for the denial of
benefits. Id. at 1039-40, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 367-68.
108. See Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 104(b)(1), 84
Stat. 698 (now I.R.C. § 3309(b)(3)). Prior to 1976, § 3309(b) provided in pertinent part:
(b) Section Not To Apply to Certain Service.-This section shall not apply to service
performed-
(1) in the employ of (A) a church or convention or association of churches, or (B) an
organization which is operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated,
supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association
of churches;
(2) by a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the exercise
of his ministry or by a member of a religious order in the exercise of duties required by
such order;
(3) in the employ of a school which is not an institution of higher education ....
Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 104(b)(1)-(3), 84 Stat. 698 (emphasis added).
109. See Phase III, 1975 Hearings, supra note 56, at 15 (statement of Hon. John T. Dunlop,
Secretary of Labor); id. at 435 (statement of James A. Harris, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n).
110. Id. at 433 (statement of Terry Herndon, Executive Director, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n).
111. Id. at 435-38 (statement of James A. Harris, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n); id. at 432-40
(statement of Terry Herndon, Executive Director, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n); Extend and Modify the
Federal Supplemental Benefits and Special Unemployment Assistance Programs: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Unemployment Compensation of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 113-20 (1976) (statement of Judith M. Owens, President, N.J. Educ.
Ass'n); Phase II: Extending Temporary Benefits: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Unemploy-
ment Compensation of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 194, 196
(1975) (statement of James A. Harris, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n); Administration and Other
Proposals on Unemployment Compensation: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
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FUTA's general exclusion for elementary and secondary schools. 112 The Sen-
ate Report accompanying the bill manifested the intent of Congress to
bring both public and nonreligious private elementary and secondary schools
within the scope of FUTA. 113
With the elimination of the section 3309(b)(3) blanket exclusion for
schools, Christian schools are presently within FUTA's scope unless they can
demonstrate that they are excepted by some other section which excludes
services performed, such as section 3309(b)(1) or section 3309(b)(2). These
sections provide that FUTA shall not apply to service performed:
(1) in the employ of (A) a church or convention or association
of churches, or (B) an organization which is operated primarily for
religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled,
or principally supported by a church or convention or association of
churches;
(2) by a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a
church in the exercise of his ministry or by a member of a religious
order in the exercise of duties required by such order .... 114
Although the Labor Department contends that the legislative history of sec-
tion 3309(b)(1) negatives any congressional intent to exempt church-related
schools from FUTA, 115 at least one federal court1 16 and a state attorney gen-
Means, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 251-68 (1974) (statement of Dr. Helen D. Wise, President, Nat'l
Educ. Ass'n).
112. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, § 115(b)(1), 90
Stat. 2670.
113. In the Senate Report accompanying the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of
1976, the following explanation was given for the changes regarding nonprofit elementary and
secondary schools:
Prior to the 1970 amendments, nonprofit organizations, which are exempt from taxation
under the Internal Revenue Code, were covered as employers for unemployment com-
pensation purposes only at the option of the States. The 1970 amendments required
States to provide coverage for nonprofit employers who have at least four employees in at
least 20 weeks of the year. However, an exception in the law allows States to exclude
from coverage nonprofit elementary and secondary schools. The committee bill would re-
peal this exclusion, thus requiring coverage for such schools on the same basis as it is
required for other nonprofit entities.
S. REP. No. 1265, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 10, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5997, 6005-06 (emphasis added).
114. I.R.C. J 3309(b)(1), (2). A separate FUTA exclusion applies to all employers "not
employing four or more individuals during any 20 weeks of the year." I.R.C. § 3309(c). While
some church-related schools may commence operations with only three employees (for example.
three teachers teaching grades one through three, with the minister, excluded from FUTA
coverage by § 3309(b)(2), acting as supervisor and administrator), it is nonetheless evidence that
§ 3309(c) does not act to exclude a significant proportion of Christian schools from FUTA.
115. See note 124 infra. Regarding the interpretation to be accorded § 3309(b)(1), both the
House and Senate Reports accompanying the bill stated:
This paragraph excludes services of persons where the employer is a church or con-
vention or association of churches, but does not exclude certain services performed for an
organization which may be religious in orientation unless it is operated primarily for re-
ligious purposes and is operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a
church (or convention or association of churches). Thus, the services of the janitor of a
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eral 117 have reached the contrary conclusion that section 3309(b)(1) does
exclude church schools from FUTA coverage. Under subsection (2) of section
3309(b) there appears to be no dispute that the service of a minister,
employed in a dual capacity as minister of the church and principal of the
school, is excluded from FUTA coverage; 118 however, no indication has
emerged as to whether other church officers serving in the school qualify for
a section 3309(b)(2) exemption as "member[s] of a religious order." 119
2. Administrative Interpretation of the 1976 Amendments
In 1978, United States Secretary of Labor, Raymond Marshall, issued
an opinion letter120 officially stating for the first time 121 that church-related
church would be excluded, but services of a janitor for a separately incorporated college,
although it may be church related, would be covered. A college devoted primarily to
preparing students for the ministry would be exempt, as would a novitiate or a house of
study training candidates to become members of religious orders. On the other hand, a
church related (separately incorporated) charitable organization (such as, for example, an
orphanage or a home for the aged) would not be considered under this paragraph to be
operated primarily for religious purposes.
H.R. REP. No. 612, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1969); S. REP. No. 752, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 48
(1970). For a discussion of the Labor Department's construction of § 3309(b)(1), see notes 120-34
& 188 and accompanying text infra.
116. Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP, slip op. at
7-9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979). For a discussion of Grace Brethren, see notes 143-49 and ac-
companying text infra. A number of state courts have agreed that the Labor Department's
position is contrary to the plain language of the statute. See Trinity Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. Department of Indus. Relat., No. CV 78-500325 (Cir. Ct. Mobile County, Ala. Jan.
27, 1979); Roman Catholic Church v. Louisiana, No. 219, 660 (19th Jud. Dist. Ct., East Baton
Rouge Parish, La. Aug. 31, 1979) (notice of appeal filed Oct. 17, 1979); Grace Lutheran Church
v. North Dakota Employment Security Bureau, Civ. No. 28234 (N.D. Dist. Ct., Oct. 10, 1979);
Employment Division v. Archdiocese of Portland, 42 Or. App. 421, 600 P.2d 926 (1979); In re
Determination of Unemployment Ins. Coverage, No. CA 78-248 (S.D. Cir. Ct., Mar. 19, 1979),
appeal docketed, No. 12801 (S.D. Sup. Ct., May 25, 1979).
117. Opinion of the Attorney General of Michigan, No. 5434 (January 19, 1979). For the
relevant text of this opinion, see note 190 infra. See also United States Dep't of Labor v.
Alabama Dep't of Indus. Relat., slip op. at 7-9 (Conformity Proceeding, Recommended Deci-
sion of the Administrative Law Judge, Oct. 11, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-3968 (5th Cir.
Dec. 11, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Conformity Proceeding- Recommended Decision].
118. The Labor Department has stated that FUTA § 3309(b)(2) "is not at issue." Directive
from Lawrence W. Rogers, Administrator of Field Operations, Employment and Training Ad-
ministration, U.S. Dep't of Labor, to all State Employment Security Agencies, at 2 (May 30,
1978) [hereinafter cited as Directive from Rogers]. This contention would appear to be based on
the fact that § 3309(b)(2) excludes all service performed by a particular profession and obviates
the need to determine what constitutes "service in the employ of a church" (which is required
under § 3309(b)(1)). See text accompanying note 114 supra.
119. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
120. Letter from the Honorable F. Ray Marshall to the Most Reverend Thomas E. Kelly,
O.P. (April 18, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Letter from Marshall], quoted in Independent Baptist
Church v. Tennessee, 468 F. Supp. 71, 74 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
121. An administrative law judge recently stated that immediately after the 1976 amendments
to FUTA were passed, the Labor Department issued two nonpublic memoranda to the states
indicating that church-school employees were still excluded from FUTA under § 3309(b)(1).
Conformity Proceedings-Recommended Decision, supra note 117, at 6. These contemporaneous
statutory constructions were in direct conflict with a May 30, 1978, directive of the Labor
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elementary and secondary schools are "clearly covered" by FUTA. 22 The
Secretary's opinion was formulated in response to the contentions of the
United States Catholic Conference, an organization representing the nation's
parochial school system, that parochial schools should be excluded from
FUTA coverage on both statutory and constitutional grounds. l2 3
Based on this determination by Secretary Marshall, a directive was is-
sued from the United States Department of Labor to all state employment
security agencies on May 30, 1978.124 In that directive, Lawrence W. Rog-
ers, the Labor Department's Administrator of Field Operations, informed
the states that "[b]y repealing the former exclusion in section 3309(b)(3) of
Department. Id. at 7. For a discussion of the pertinent parts of this May 30, 1978, directive, see
notes 124-25 and accompanying text infra.
122. Letter from Marshall, supra note 120, at 1. In this letter, Secretary Marshall construed
the 1976 amendments to FUTA as follows:
In light of the repeal of 3309(b)(3), we think the only services performed in [church-
related] schools that may reasonably be considered within the scope of the exclusion per-
mitted by section 3309(b)(1) are those strictly church duties performed by church
employees pursuant to their religious responsibilities within the schools.
We believe also that unemployment insurance coverage of employees of church-
related schools is constitutionally permissible. This view is based on a thorough review of
relevant court decisions and application of the tests of constitutionality that have been
advanced in deciding First Amendment issues.
I trust this letter clearly expresses the Department's position.
Letter from Marshall, supra note 120, at 1, 2.
123. Memorandum of Law prepared by George E. Reed and Gerald C. Tobin, United States
Catholic Conference, for submission to the United States Labor Department (December 21,
1977). In its memorandum, the United States Catholic Conference made the following argu-
ments: 1) the parochial school is an integral part of the church and is essentially religious, id. at
3; 2) neither the legislative history of the 1970 FUTA amendments nor that of the 1976 amend-
ments provides support for the contention that parochial schools were meant to be included
under the Act, id. at 5; 3) the term "church" has consistently been interpreted in the Internal
Revenue Code to include parochial schools, id. at 6; 4) the parochial schools meet the necessary
requirements for exemptions under § 3309(b)(1)(B) of FUTA, id. at 10; 5) the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in the church-state field have repeatedly defined Catholic schools
as primarily operated for religious purposes and completely controlled by the Catholic Church,
id. at 11; and 6) the imposition of the unemployment compensation tax over parochial schools
has the effect of entangling the state in church affairs and, therefore, violates the Constitution of
the United States. Id. at 14.
124. Directive from Rogers, supra note 118, at 2-3, cited in Independent Baptist Church v.
Tennessee, 468 F. Supp. 71, 74 (E.D. Tenn. 1978). This directive provides in pertinent part:
The only services performed in church-related elementary and secondary schools recog-
nized as being within the scope of the exclusion permitted by section 3309(b)(1), FUTA,
(and aside from the permitted (b)(2) exclusions) are those strictly church duties performed
by church employees at the schools pursuant to their church responsibilities. The exclu-
sion in section 3309(b)(1)(A) relating to church employees has no other application to
activities performed in elementnary and secondary schools since the schools are not
churches within the meaning of that section. The exclusion contained in section
3309(b)(1)(B) applies only to services performed for organizations, other than educational
institutions, that are church operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported
and whose employees are primarily engaged in religious activities. Subsection (b)(1)(B)
does n6t apply to institutions where the employees of the institution are primarily en-
gaged in educational activities at the elementary and secondary school level.
Directive from Rogers, supra, at 2-3.
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the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) relating to services for educa-
tional institutions, Congress clearly intended to extend coverage to services
for church-related schools." 125 No citation was made to any congressional
history to substantiate this assertion. Rogers further indicated that states
which had not yet done so were required to enact legislation paralleling the
1976 FUTA amendments 126 and to inform the church schools of their newly
determined coverage.' 2 7 Within months, most of the states had complied
with the Labor Department's directive. 128
Recently, the Secretary of Labor issued a determination denying certifi-
cation of the unemployment compensation statutes of Nevada12 9 and
Alabama130 due to the refusal of these states to require church schools to
pay unemployment taxes. 13 1  In that determination, the Secretary reaf-
firmed the prior position of the Labor Department that 1) the schools are
not excluded by FUTA section 3309(b)(1); 132 2) Congress intended to bring
church schools within FUTA's coverage by repealing FUTA section
3309(b)(3); 133 and 3) unemployment compensation coverage of Christian
schools does not violate the first amendment religion clauses.' 3 4
125. Directive from Rogers, supra note 118, at 2.
126. Id. at 4.
127. Id. at 3.
128. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 30, 1978, ch. 2, § 36.5, 1978 Cal. Stats. 6 (eff. Jan. 30, 1978)
(amending 65 CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 634.5(c) (West Supp. 1979)); Act of June 16, 1977, ch.
77-262, 1977 Fla. Laws 1282 (eff. Jan. 1, 1978) (amending 15 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.03(5)(d)3
(West Supp. 1979)); Act of Nov. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. -. , 1977 Ill. Laws 80-1, § 1 (eff. Nov. 9,
1977) (amending ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 330.C (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979)); Act of Dec. 22,
1977, Pub. L. No. 277, 1977 Mich. Pub. Acts 937 (eff. Jan. 1, 1978) (amending 20 MicH.
CoMp. LAws ANN. § 421.43(o)(3) (West 1978)); 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 675, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 1978)
(amending N.Y. LAB. LAW § 575 (McKinney 1977)); Act of July 6, 1977, Pub. L. No. 22, § 1,
1977 Pa. Laws 41 (eff. Jan. 1, 1978) (amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 753(1)(4)(7) (Purdons
1964)); Act of June 10, 1977, ch. 368, § 17, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 981 (eff. Jan. 1, 1978) (amend-
ing TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5221b-17(g)(5)(E), (H)).
129. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 612.010-.760 (1967).
130. ALA. CODE tit. 26, §§ 180-252 (1958).
131. Conformity Proceeding-Decision of the Secretary, supra note 50, at 2.
132. Id. at 6a, 9-10.
133. Id. at 10-11.
134. Id. at 11-16. In determining that the unemployment compensation laws do not violate
the first amendment religious rights of church-related schools, the Secretary maintained that the
laws create no excessive entanglement of church and state. Id. at 12. The Secretary stated that
"there would be no need to become involved in ... resolving disputes as to church doctrines in
order to resolve claims for benefits," and since "the surveillance and monitoring occur primarily
at the governmental level and do not require interference with the internal operations of the
schools, the entanglement is not excessive." Id. at 12. For countervailing considerations to this
argument, see notes 340-43 & 368 and accompanying text infra. The Secretary also maintained
that since "FUTA does not mandate that state insurance laws deny any individuals unemploy-
ment benefits," the federal law does not require potentially entangling "good cause" determina-
tions with respect to the unemployed of Christian schools. Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).
In this argument, the Secretary appears to be stating that the federal law is not unconstitu-
tional as applied to church-related schools because it contains no provision requiring the denial
of benefits when "good cause" for the termination is lacking, and because only the state laws
have such provisions which they are free to delete. This contention, however, appears to ignore
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E. Recent Litigation Spawned by Mandatory Coverage
Christian schools have recently filed suits in both state 135 and federal 136
courts seeking to enjoin the state unemployment security bureaus from levy-
ing unemployment compensation taxes against them. The federal court litiga-
tion has been initiated in California, 137 Tennessee, 38 Ohio, 139 and Pennsyl-
vania. 140 All but the California case have been summarily disposed of in
favor of the states on the jurisdictional basis of the Tax Injunction Act of
1937,141 which prevents federal district courts from enjoining the assess-
ment, levy, or collection of any state tax when a "plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 142
the fact that the unemployment compensation laws are a closely interrelated federal-state system
of legislation, see notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra, and that there are both practical
and policy reasons why the laws have never awarded (and never were intended to award) ben-
efits to all applicants regardless of the reasons for termination of their employment. See note
57 supra. In addition, it is clear that even if the states did eliminate all eligibility requirements
for benefits for ex-employees of Christian schools, there would be a substantial increase in the
schools' "experience rating" or reimbursement liability and, thus, the existing free exercise bur-
dens on the schools would be exacerbated. See notes 318-33 and accompanying text infra.
The Secretary also distinguished NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1313
(1979), see notes 205-18 & 245-52 and accompanying text infra, on the basis that, unlike the
NLRA in Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the unemployment laws in the instant decision did not
have a "chilling effect" on the discretion of Christian school administrators or entail "excessive
entanglement" of church and state. Id. at 14-15. For an analysis reaching a contrary conclusion,
see notes 342 & 365-69 and accompanying text infra.
Finally, the Secretary concluded that imposing a uniform tax generally applicable to all
schools, whether secular or religious, did not entail any free exercise problems because of the
Court's holding in Braunfeld v. Brown, 336 U.S. 599 (1961), "where the court concluded that a
statute could not be invalidated on free exercise grounds merely because it made the practice of
religion more expensive." Conformity Proceeding-Decision of the Secretary, supra note 50, at
15. For an analysis to the contrary, see notes 344-48 and accompanying text infra.
135. See notes 150-54 and accompanying text infra.
136. See notes 137-49 and accompanying text infra.
137. Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 21, 1979).
138. Independent Baptist Church v. Tennessee, 468 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Tenn. 1978). Inde-
pendent Baptist involved a suit brought by the administrators of forty elementary and secondary
Christian schools seeking injunctive relief from the imposition of Tennessee's unemployment
compensation laws upon them. Id. at 73.
139. St. John Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Giles, No. C78-1516 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 18, 1979)
(mem.).
140. Germantown Friends School v. Joseph, No. 79-1539 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1979) (involving
two Philadelphia Quaker schools operated by separate "monthly meetings," or local congrega-
tions, of the Society of Friends).
141. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
142. Id. The court in Independent Baptist Church v. Tennessee, 468 F. Supp. 71 (E.D.
Tenn. 1978), concluded that the plaintiffs had a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" in Tennes-
see's state courts and, thus, the suit was dismissed. Id. at 75. The court in St. John Lutheran
Church, Inc. v. Giles, No. C78-1516 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 18, 1979), remanded the case to the
county court on the same basis. Id. slip op. at 3, 4 (mem.). The Tax Injunction Act of 1937 was
also the basis upon which suit was dismissed in Germantown Friends School v. Joseph, No.
79-1539, slip op. at 2, 14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1979).
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The district court in Grace Brethren Church v. California 143 found the
Tax Injunction Act to be inapplicable to that case because the plaintiffs did
not have a certain remedy in the state court,'" and because the very proc-
ess of determining whether the schools were subject to taxation violated their
free exercise rights. 145  Having thus found jurisdiction to decide the case,
the Grace Brethren court enjoined the state from collecting unemployment
compensation taxes from the schools.14 6  The court based its injunction on
separate findings that 1) the schools came within FUTA's section
3309(b)(1)(A) "church" exception; 147 2) the imposition and collection of the
tax was unconstitutional due to "excessive entanglement"; 148 and 3) the
schools would possibly suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunc-
tion. 149
Several unemployment compensation cases have also been initiated by
Christian schools in the state courts. 1 50 The state court cases which have
actually reached the substantive issues have all been decided at the trial
level in favor of the schools.151 In Independent Baptist Church v. Tennes-
see, 152 for example, the trial court ignored the statutory issues, finding that
the Baptist schools were an integral part of the church 15' and that any at-
143. Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979). The action brought
by Grace Brethren Church was consolidated for decision with a similar suit, Lutheran
Church-Missouri Synod v. California, No. CV 79-162 MRP (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979). Id.
slip op. at 4. Three of the 12 Brethren schools in the first case are church owned and operated.
No. CV 79-93 MRP, Complaint at 3. The other nine are comprised of two separate parent-
owned communities of schools of four and five schools each. Id. at 3-4. The plaintiff schools in
the second case are 85 Lutheran schools operated under the auspices of that denomination.
Nos. CV 79-93, CV 79-162 MRP, slip op. at 4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979).
144. Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP, slip op. at
14 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979).
145. Id. slip. op. at 15.
146. Id. slip. op. at 18.
147. Id. slip. op. at 8.
148. Id. slip. op. at 9-12.
149. Id. slip. op. at 12-14.
150. See Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Department of Indus. Relat., No. CV 78-
500325 (Cir. Ct. Mobile County, Ala. Jan. 27, 1979); Roman Catholic Church v. Louisiana, No.
219,660 (19th Jud. Dist. Ct., East Baton Rouge Parish, La. Aug. 31, 1979); Frankford Friends
School v. Joseph, No. 941 (Pa. Commw. Ct., filed Oct. 10, 1979); Germantown Friends School
v. Joseph, No. 941 (Pa. Commw. Ct., filed Oct. 10, 1979); Independent Baptist Church v.
Tennessee, No. 54227, (Ch. Ct. Hamilton County, Tenn. March 23, 1979) (unpublished opin-
ion). See additional cases cited note 116 supra.
151. See Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Department of Indus. Relat., No. CV 78-
500325 (Cir. Ct. Mobile County, Ala. Jan. 27, 1979); Roman Catholic Church v. Louisiana, No.
219,660 (19th Jud. Dist. Ct., East Baton Rouge Parish, La. Aug. 31, 1979); Independent Baptist
Church v. Tennessee, No. 54227 (Ch. Ct. Hamilton County, Tenn. March 23, 1979) (unpub-
lished opinion). See additional cases cited note 116 supra.
152. No. 54227 (Ch. Ct. Hamilton County, Tenn. March 23, 1979) (unpublished opinion).
The schools involved in the case were all Baptist church schools primarily utilizing church
facilities. Id. at 2.
153. Id. at 3-4.
[VOL. 25: p. 69
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss1/6
tempt to tax them would constitute an infringement of their first amendment
religious liberties. 15
In an important recent development, the Secretary of Labor has initiated
conformity proceedings 155 against six states on the basis of their refusal to
extend the coverage of their state unemployment laws to church-related
schools.' 56  Despite the recommended decision of an administrative law
judge 157 that coverage of the church schools is neither statutorily man-
dated 158 nor constitutionally permissible, 15 9 the Secretary has declared that
two of the states, Alabama and Nevada, are not in conformity with
FUTA.' 6 0 This decision by the Secretary has been appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.' 6 ' The four other states in-
volved in the conformity proceedings, Michigan, Tennessee, Texas, and
Washington, have consented to a postponement of the Secretary's determi-
nation of whether their unemployment statutes conform to FUTA. 162
154. Id. at 6-8. On the basis of the finding that the free exercise rights of the schools could
be unconstitutionally infringed, the court granted an injunction against collection of the state
tax. Id. at 9.
155. See Conformity Proceeding- Recommended Decision, supra note 117, at 2; Conformity
Proceeding- Decision of the Secretary, supra note 50, at 1, 2.
156. Conformity Proceeding-Recommended Decision, supra note 117, at I & n.1.
157. Conformity Proceeding-Recommended Decision, supra note 117.
158. Id. at 7-9. With respect to the proper interpretation of FUTA, the judge made the
following observations: 1) § 3309(b)(1), when read literally, exempts all employment in the serv-
ice of "church," and looks to the religious nature of the employer, not to the nature of the
employment, id. at 8; 2) the Department's reliance on language in the Senate Report accom-
panying the deletion of § 3309(b)(3) (that the deletion would cover 242,000 additional
employees-a figure which corresponds to the Department's figure for the total number of
employees in all nonprofit schools) was "misplaced" and a "slender thread" because "the figure
is without meaning unless accompanied by the raw data and, admittedly, the record is silent"
concerning such data, id.; 3) the deletion of § 3309(b)(3) was unaccompanied by any definitive
language expressly indicating an intent to tax church schools, id.; and 4) the Department's
definition of the term "church" is inconsistent with the meaning given to that term throughout
the Internal Revenue Code. Id.
159. Id. at 7-8. The judge adopted in full the constitutional conclusions of the courts in three
previous cases, each of which was decided in favor of the schools. See id. at 8, citing Grace
Brethren Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21,
1979); Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Department of Indus. Relat., No. CV 78-500325,
(Cir. Ct. Mobile County, Ala. Jan. 27, 1979); Roman Catholic Church v. Louisiana, No. 219,660
(19th Jud. Dist. Ct., East Baton Rouge Parish, La. Aug. 31, 1979).
160. Conformity Proceeding- Decision of the Secretary, supra note 50, at 25.
161. Alabama v. Marshall, No. 79-3968 (5th Cir., docketed Dec. 11, 1979). The appeal proc-
ess in the event of the noncertification of a state unemployment security law is set out in 42
U.S.C. § 504 (1976). Upon the unfavorable determination of the Secretary, the noncertified
state has 60 days to file a petition for review in the federal court of appeals in which the state is
located or in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Id. § 504(a). The statute pro-
vides for various stays of the Secretary's decision to withhold certification of the nonconforming
state during the appeal process. Id. § 504(d). The judgment of the court of appeals, either
affirming or setting aside the decision of the Secretary, is subject to review by the United States
Supreme Court upon certiorari or certification. Id. § 504(c). Judicial proceedings under § 504
are entitled to a preference "and shall be heard and determined as expeditiously as possible"
upon the request of the Secretary. Id. § 504(e).
162. Conformity Proceeding- Recommended Decision, supra note 117, at 1 & ni..
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III. A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
A. Statutory Interpretation
1. Institutional Considerations
The issue of whether Christian schools should be subject to the un-
employment compensation laws involves both statutory 163 and constitutional
dimensions. 16 4 The analysis of this comment will follow the traditional ap-
proach of the Supreme Court by first considering possible statutory grounds
for resolving the conflict. 165
In resolving the issue on statutory grounds, it is important to note that
all nonprofit organizations, including Christian schools, are exempted from
the federal unemployment tax by FUTA section 3306(c)(8). 166 Only the
states are required by FUTA section 3309 to subject nonexempt, nonprofit
organizations to the state unemployment laws. 167 Therefore, it is the state
unemployment laws which must be challenged in the first instance by the
aggrieved Christian schools since only the state laws tax or otherwise directly
affect these schools. 168 However, since the federal-state unemployment sys-
tem involves a four-tiered devolution of authority-from Congress to the
Labor Department, to the state legislatures, and ultimately to the state
employment security bureaus 169 -determining the validity of a particular
state law provision may necessitate a separate inquiry at each of these four
levels.
Particularly significant in the federal-state unemployment system is the
role of the Department of Labor. Due to the effectiveness of the certification
163. For a discussion of the statutory questions involved in bringing Christian schools within
the unemployment compensation laws, see notes 166-252 and accompanying text infra.
164. For a discussion of the constitutional issues involved, see notes 310-69 and accompanying
text infra.
165. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1313, 1318 (1979); The Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
166. I.R.C. § 3306(c) states in pertinent part: "For purposes of this chapter, the term
'employment' means any service performed .. . except- . . (8) service performed in the
employ of a religious, charitable, educational, or other organization described in section
501(c)(3) which is exempt from income tax under section 501(a)." Id.
167. I.R.C. § 3309(a). See Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV
79-162 MRP, slip op. at 2 n.6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979).
168. See I.R.C. § 3309(a).
169. For an overview of the federal-state unemployment compensation system, see notes
37-67 and accompanying text supra. The policy of bringing Christian schools within the state
unemployment compensation programs evolved out of the following interdependent chain of
events. First, without ever specifically mentioning church schools, Congress amended FUTA by
deleting § 3309(b)(3). See notes 112-13 supra. Second, the Department of Labor interpreted the
amendment as bringing church-related schools within FUTA's scope; thus, the Department di-
rected the states to amend their statutes to reflect the change in FUTA and to interpret their
statutes in accordance with the Departnent's interpretation. See notes 120-34 and accompany-
ing text supra. Third, the state legislatures eliminated their school employment exemptions. See
note 98 and accompanying text supra. Finally, the state employment security boards executed
the law by levying unemployment taxes on church-related schools. See notes 124 & 127 and
accompanying text supra.
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process, 170 the states are not only compelled to adopt the substantive provi-
sions of FUTA, 1 7 1 but also to interpret and apply those provisions in con-
formity with the directives of the Labor Department. 172 Therefore, insofar
as Christian schools are challenging the state unemployment statutes as in-
terpreted and applied to them, they are ultimately, albeit indirectly, chal-
lenging the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of FUTA.1 73 If Christian
schools are able to effect an invalidation or alteration of the Department's
interpretation of section 3309 of FUTA, the certification process will tend to
assure a resultant change in the interpretation and application of the state
laws as applied to the schools. 174
2. The Section 3309(b)(1) Exception
Since section 3309(a) of FUTA requires states to include all nonexempt,
nonprofit organizations in the state unemployment compensation pro-
grams, 175 Christian schools, which fall within the definition of a nonprofit
organization, 176 must demonstrate that they come within one of the specific
exclusions provided in subsections (b) and (c) of section 3309 177 in order to
be exempt from the state law coverage. Although the Department of Labor
has issued a contrary determination, 1 78 it is submitted that the two
catagories of section 3309(b)(1) of FUTA179 may provide many Christian
schools with such an exemption.
Subsection (A) of section 3309(b)(1) exempts all services performed in
the employ of a church or an association of churches.'18 0 It is arguable that a
substantial minority of Christian schools would qualify for the section
170. For a discussion of the certification process, see notes 61-66 and accompanying text
supra.
171. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
172. See notes 67-70 & 124-27 and accompanying text supra. See also Grace Brethren
Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP, slip. op. at 6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21,
1979). The federal district court in Grace Brethren stated that "while initial participation in
FUTA is voluntary, once a state has established an unemployment compensation program, it is
compelled to conform its program to FUTA regulations as they may be amended from time to
time." Id.
173. See id. For example, the court in Grace Brethren noted that California "cross-claimed
against the Secretary of Labor requesting the court to countermand the Directive. In that
cross-claim, the state alleges that it interprets § 3309(b) differently from the Secretary, and that
it agrees with plaintiff's contention that employees of church schools should be exempt." Id. at
6-7.
174. For a discussion of how the certification process causes state laws to conform to FUTA,
see notes 61-66 and accompanying text supra.
175. I.R.C. § 3309(a).176. Id. § 3306(c)(8).
177. Id. § 3309(b), (c).
178. See Letter from Marshall, supra note 120. For the relevant portion of this opinion
letter, see note 122 supra.
179. I.R.C. § 3309(b)(1)(A), (B). For the text of this provision, see text accompanying note 114
supra.
180. Id. § 3309(b)(1)(A); text accompanying note 114 supra.
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3309(b)(1)(A) exception.1 8 1 The provision would seem to require, however,
that the school and the church not be separately incorporated 182 and that
the teachers and administrators have employment contracts directly with the
church. 183
Subsection (B) of section 3309(b)(1) exempts services performed in the
employ of an organization which is 1) operated primarily for religious pur-
poses; and 2) operated, controlled, or principally supported by a church or
convention or association of churches. 18 4  It is submitted that the average
Christian school would have little difficulty meeting the express require-
ments of the first element of the section 3309(b)(1)(B) test. Although a Chris-
tian school has a dual purpose-to inculcate religious precepts and impart
temporal knowledge 18 5-the religious purpose is deemed by the schools to
be preeminent, pervasive, and all-encompassing.' 8 6  Moreover, the Su-
preme Court has consistently characterized church schools as being operated
primarily for religious purposes.' 8 7  Nevertheless, it should be noted that
the Labor Department has tended to dichotomize the religious and secular
aspects of the education in church schools, reasoning that since the majority
of the instructional time in the schools is devoted to secular subjects, it
cannot follow that the schools have a primarily religious purpose.18 8
In considering the second element of this exception, it should be noted
that Congress apparently considered separate incorporation of the subject
organization as a factor strongly tending to negate the existence of the req-
uisite degree of church control. 18 9  Therefore, an application of the second
181. See notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra. A federal district court recently found two
groups of Lutheran and independent Christian schools to be exempt from unemployment com-
pensation taxation under FUTA section 3309(b)(1)(A), and the section's state law counterpart.
See Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos, CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP, slip op. at 7-9
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979). For a discussion of Grace Brethren, see notes 143-49 and accom-
panying text supra.
182. See Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos. 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP, slip op. at
7-9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979).
183. See id.
184. See I.R.C. § 3309(b)(1)(B); text accompanying note 114 supra.
185. See generally McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. 1337, 1352-53 (M.D. Pa. 1978); State
v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 199-200, 351 N.E.2d 750, 761-62 (1976). See also Grace
Brethren Church v. California, No. CV 79-93 MRP, Complaint at 6-7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21,
1979).
186. See sources cited note 185 supra.
187. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365-66 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
613-18 (1971). The Court in Meek stated:
The church-related elementary and secondary schools that are the primary
beneficiaries of. . . [the Act] typify such religion-pervasive institutions. The very purpose
of many of those schools is to provide an integrated secular and religious education; the
teaching process is, to a large extent, devoted to the inculcation of religious values and
belief.
421 U.S. at 366 (citation omitted).
188. See Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP, slip
op. at 8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979).
189. See S. REP. No. 752, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 48, 49 (1970). For the text of this legislative
history, see note 115 supra. Congress apparently intended to exclude organizations under this
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element of the section 3309(b)(1)(B) test necessitates that a distinction be
drawn between types of Christian schools based upon their organizational
structure. 190 Church owned and operated Christian schools191 would ap-
pear to pass this element of the test, since many of them are conducted on
church property, 1 92 administered by church officials, 193 predominantly sup-
ported by church funds, 194 and not separately incorporated. 1 95 In addition,
schools that require teachers to be members of the parent church often con-
sider teachers to be officers of the church ministering in Christian educa-
tion. 196 On the other hand, parent owned and operated schools197 would
not readily fall within this element of the test, since they are not directly
provision that meet both the "primary purpose" test and the "control" test. S. REP. No. 752,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 48, 49 (1970). Congress further indicated that if an organization, such as a
college, orphanage, or retirement home, is incorporated separately from the church, a strong
affiliation or relation to the church may not be sufficient to bring the organization within the
3309(b)(1)(B) exemption. Id.
190. The Attorney General of Michigan recently issued an opinion finding that, under Michi-
gan's counterpart to § 3309(b)(1)(B) of FUTA, schools operated by a church, but not other
separately incorporated religious schools, were excluded from mandatory participation in Michi-
gan's unemployment compensation programs. Opinion of the Attorney General of Michigan,
No. 5434 (January 19, 1979). See text accompanying notes 115-17 supra. Michigan's attorney
general stated with respect to church-operated schools:
If the elementary or secondary school is operated by the church, convention or association
of churches, or an organization of any of them, through its Bishop, pastor, representative
or representatives and has no separate legal identity, I am constrained to conclude that
such a person was not in the employ of a school and his employment is not subject to the
provisions of [Michigan's unemployment compensation statute].
Opinion of the Attorney General of Michigan, No. 5434 (January 19, 1979). Regarding sepa-
rately incorporated or parent-owned religious schools, the Attorney General of Michigan opined:
"[I]f such a person is in the employ of a religiously-oriented school which has a separate legal
existence apart from the organizations listed in [Michigan's unemployment statute corresponding
to I.R.C. § 3309(b)(1)], then it is my opinion that the exclusion found [therein] is inapplicable."
Opinion of the Attorney General of Michigan, No. 5434 (January 19, 1979).
191. One observer has written: "Indeed, the phrase 'Christian schools' encompasses institu-
tions as diverse as one-room Calvinist schools with 15 to 20 students; fundamentalist Baptist
schools that meet in church basements; nondenominational, four-campus complexes, and just
about any variation in between." THE NAT'L OBSERVER, Jan. 15, 1977, at 1. See also U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 8, 1973, at 45, 46.
192. See sources cited note 191 supra.
193. See sources cited note 191 supra. See also The Philadelphia Bulletin, July 9, 1978, at 1,
col. 2.
194. See sources cited note 193 supra. With respect to Lutheran and parochial schools, one
article stated: "Missouri Synod officials estimated payment of the [unemployment compensation]
tax will cost their congregations some $3 million while Roman Catholics could pay as much as
$15 million." The Philadelphia Bulletin, July 9, 1978, at 8, col. 1.
195. See Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP, slip
op. at 8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979).
196. Unemployment Insurance Coverage of Teachers in Christian Schools, Memorandum of
Law submitted by Attorneys W. Ball and P. Muren to the Unemployment Insurance Division of
the New York Department of Labor, at 7-8. (1979) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Christian School
Memorandum].
197. For a discussion of parent owned and operated Christian schools, see note 26 and ac-
companying text supra.
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associated with any one local church 198 and are usually separately incorpo-
rated. 199
Should either or both types of Christian schools described herein be
successful in arguing that they fall within FUTA's section 3309(b)(1)(B)
exemption, there would be at last two important consequences for the
schools. First, since the state laws have exclusionary provisions worded and
interpreted consistently with FUTA section 3309(b)(1)(B),2 0 0 a determination
that Christian schools are excluded by that section would likely result in a
concomitant tax exemption for Christian schools under the state law coun-
terparts to section 3309(b)(1)(B). Second, should only separately incorporated
Christian schools be denied exemption under section 3309(b)(1)(B), they may
be able to argue successfully that it is unconstitutional to distinguish be-
tween Christian schools in order to tax some and exempt others, solely on
the basis of differing religious organizational structures.20 1
198. See note 26 and accompanying text supra. Nevertheless, it could be argued that under a
broader reading of "church," the parents who own, control, and principally support a Christian
school constitute a "church." While the parents involved in Christian schools may not all be
members of the same local congregation of worshippers, they tend to share common religious
goals and ideals, meet regularly, and engage corporately in worship and other religious ac-
tivities. See note 26 and accompanying text supra. Without labelling themselves a "church"
then, the parents of many parent owned Christian schools manifest in the course of their
school-related activities many of the traditional characteristics of a conventional church. While
the Supreme Court has broadened the constitutional scope of the term "religion," see Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 33 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), the Court has
not yet attempted to define a "church." However, in light of the Supreme Court's broad defini-
tion of "religion," and the Internal Revenue Code's expansive concept of what constitutes a
"church," there would seem to be some merit to the argument that the parents of a parent
owned and operated Christian school constitute a "church." See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 3306(c)(8),
3309(a)(1)(A). Moreover, based on the wide spectrum of beliefs which may constitute a "reh-
gion," it would seem anomolous that, in order to afford certain organizations special tax treat-
ment, Congress could discriminate on the basis of time, frequency, place, and manner of vari-
ous modes of exercising religious beliefs. Although Congress may constitutionally authorize the
Internal Revenue Service to revoke a religious organization's tax exempt status because the
organization is not primarily engaged in religious activities, see Parker v. C.I.R., 365 F.2d 792
(8th Cir. 1966), the cases are in agreement that Christian schools are primarily engaged in
religious activities. See, e.g., Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV
79-162 MRP, slip op. at 10-12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181,
187-90, 199-200, 351 N.E.2d 750, 754-57, 761-62 (1976); Independent Baptist Church v. Ten-
nessee, No. 54227, slip op. at 2-6, 8 (Ch. Ct. Hamilton County, Tenn. March 23, 1979) (unpub-
lished opinion). See also notes 137-54 and accompanying text supra.
199. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
200. See notes 126-28 and accompanying text supra.
201. It may be posited for purposes of this discussion that separately incorporated Christian
schools are no less religious in their beliefs, teachings, or practices, and are no less an integral
part of the religious mission of the Christian faith, than their church-school counterparts. Given
this assumption, the argument of separately incorporated Christian school that the unemploy-
ment compensation laws are unconstitutional as applied to them would be based on the proposi-
tion that, under the religion clauses of the first amendment, the government cannot bestow a
benefit or impose a burden which differentiates between two otherwise identical Christian
schools simply because one is tied to the hierarchical structure of the local church and the other
is not. This kind of liability-determinative classification, it could be argued, constitutes gov-
ernmental discrimination based on the form of worship. The Supreme Court has stated in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 293 (1940), that "freedom to adhere to such religious organi-
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3. Lack of Express Congressional Intent: The Catholic Bishop of Chicago
Test
Buttressing the foregoing analysis, that section 3309(b)(1) of FUTA pro-
vides unemployment tax exemptions for Christian schools, is the fact that
Congress, in deleting the original section 3309(b)(3) from FUTA in 1976,202
expressed no specific intent to require states to tax Christian schools. Lack of
such specific intent is important in two respects. First, the Labor Depart-
zation or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law .... The
Religion Clauses safeguar[d] the free exercise of the chosen form of worship." Id. at 303-04
(emphasis added). In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1962), the Court in-
sisted that "the Free Exercise Clause ... recognizes the value of religious training, teaching,
and observance, and, more particularly, the right of every person to freely choose his own
course with reference thereto, free from any compulsion from the state." Id. at 222 (emphasis
added).
The due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth and fifth amendments may
supplement and provide support for this analysis. One federal court recently summarized the
Supreme Court's closely related analyses under these clauses as follows:
The legislation in question can be examined to determine whether its classifying distinc-
tions lack any reasonable relationship to achieve any legitimate purpose (equal protection),
or it can be examined to determine whether it unreasonably and unjustifiably transgresses
the fundamental restrictions on the power of government to intrude upon individual
rights and liberty (substantive due process). Under either analysis, it is the adoption of
irrational legislative means to achieve asserted goals that violate [sic] the constitutional
guarantee.
Patch Enterprises, Inc. v. McCall, 447 F. Supp. 1075, 1080 (M.D. Fla. 1978). See generally
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399-403 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment);
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-03 & n.10 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
210-11 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 n.10 (1975). The
Patch Enterprises court also provided a good summary of the equal protection law which could
be used to support the contentions of the separately incorporated Christian schools:
Any form of the state legislation creating discriminatory classifications (1) that con-
cerns fundamental constitutional rights, or (2) whose defining criteria are inherently sus-
pect, or (3) that are unnecessarily restrictive and unreasonably related to the legislation's
purported purpose, is subject to challenge and examination as a denial of equal protection
of the laws .... The standard of the equal protection clause is whether a particular legis-
lative decision unreasonably discriminates either in its definition of a class, in its treat-
ment of fundamental rights, or in its choice of means to accomplish an intended objective.
447 F. Supp. at 1078-79 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Under these principles, the sepa-
rately incorporated Christian schools would argue that 1) the federal-state unemployment com-
pensation system has created a discriminatory classification based upon the constitutionally pro-
tected right of freedom to choose one's own organization or form of worship described by the
Cantwell Court; 2) this liability-determinitive classification is not rationally related to the legiti-
mate governmental goals associated with the unemployment laws, see notes 53-55 and accom-
panying text supra and notes 352-55 and accompanying text infra; and 3) there is no rational
basis for depriving one religious school of its liberty and property while at the same time
exempting another from such deprivation solely because of structural and formal considerations.
For another constitutional argument which could be asserted by the separately incorporated
Christian schools (an argument based upon their first amendment free exercise rights), see notes
254-369 and accompanying text infra.
202. Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 104(b)(1), 84 Stat.
698. In 1976, Congress replaced the original § 3309(b)(3) with a new, unrelated provision. Un-
employment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, § 115(b)(1), 90 Stat.
2670. Regarding the 1976 FUTA amendments which deleted § 3309(b)(3), see notes 108-13 and
accompanying text supra.
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ment's directive to the states to bring all Christian schools within the state
unemployment laws was expressly based on the Department's determination
that Congress, in deleting the original section 3309(b)(3), had specifically in-
tended such a result.20 3 If such specific intent does not exist, the Labor
Department's directive may be invalid as being outside the scope of congres-
sional authorization. 20 4
Second, a recent Supreme Court decision, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago,2 0 5 indicates that an administrative agency may not engage in ac-
tivities which tend to jeopardize the religious freedoms of an organization
unless the agency's conduct is authorized by a clear expression of an affirma-
tive congressional intent.2 0 6 In Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) attempted to assert jurisdiction over two
groups of parochial schools which refused to recognize or bargain with their
respective lay teachers' unions. 20 7 After determining that the NLRB's "rela-
tively recent" assertion of jurisdiction over religious schools208 would pre-
sent a significant risk of infringement upon their first amendment
rights,20 9 the Court stated that the NLRB's jurisdiction would be upheld
only if there existed a "clear expression of an affirmative intention of Con-
gress that teachers in church-operated schools should be covered by the
Act." 210 Since such congressional intent was not found by the Court, 211 it
203. See notes 122-25 and accompanying text supra.
204. See also notes 205-12 and accompanying text infra.
205. 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979).
206. Id. at 1319, 1322. For a discussion of the Catholic Bishop of Chicago test, see notes
208-12 and accompanying text infra.
207. 99 S. Ct. at 1314-15. One group of schools, operating as "minor seminaries," admitted
primarily potential priests; the other group had no special admissions criteria and offered secular
courses. Id. at 1314-15. Parochial lay teachers' unions filed charges of unfair labor practices with
the NLRB, primarily as a result of actual or threatened teacher layoffs for violation of the
schools' religious standards. Id. at 1320. In responding to these charges, the schools asserted
that their actions were taken in accordance with their religious beliefs. Id.
208. Id. at 1317.
209. Id. at 1320, 1322. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger observed that in resolv-
ing the conflict between the unions and the schools, the NLRB would be forced to inquire into
"the good faith of the position asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to the
school's religious mission." Id. at 1320. After holding that both the conclusions of the investiga-
tions and the very process of inquiry posed potential free exercise violations, the Court stated:
"We see no escape from conflicts flowing from the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over church-
operated schools and the consequent serious First Amendment questions that would follow." Id.
210. Id. at 1320-21. Chief Justice Burger determined at the outset of his analysis that the
case would be decided on statutory, not constitutional grounds, in order to "hee[d] the essence
of Chief Justice Marshall's admonition ... that an Act of Congress ought not to be construed to
violate the Constitution if any other possible construction remains available." Id. at 1318, citing
The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
211. 99 S. Ct. at 1320-21. The majority of the Court determined that, despite the broad
scope of authority delegated to the NLRB, "[tihere is no clear expression of an affirmative
intention of Congress that teachers in church-operated schools should be covered by the Act."
Id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun,
argued that the exemption for church-related schools found to exist by the majority had been
specifically considered by Congress and rejected. Id. at 1324-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
dissent noted that the Supreme Court had earlier stated: "This court has consistently declared
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held that the NLRB did not have jurisdiction over these parochial schools. 212
It is submitted that the numerous factual and analytical similarities be-
tween the NLRB's assertion of jurisdiction over parochial schools and the
unemployment compensation taxation of Christian schools suggest that the
rationale developed in Catholic Bishop of Chicago will prove to be impor-
tant precedent in future litigation involving Christian schools. Both situations
involve a determination made by a federal agency, in the absence of a clear
congressional mandate, to extend the coverage of a federal statute to previ-
ously exempt church-related schools.2 13  The competing interests are similar
in both cases: the government's interest in maximizing the beneficial impact
of social legislation2 14 and the employees' interest in safeguarding their
economic welfare are balanced against the desire on the part of the school
administrators for religious and economic autonomy. Finally, the types of
free exercise problems created by the subjection of the church schools to the
statutes tend to closely parallel each other.2
15
Therefore, in applying the Catholic Bishop of Chicago analysis to the
controversy between Christian schools and state unemployment agencies,
that in passing the National Labor Relations Act, Congress intended to and did vest in the
Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce
Clause." Id. at 1327 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied by the
dissent). The dissent further noted that the courts had previously upheld the NLRB's jurisdic-
tion over nonprofit and even religious institutions. Id. at 1325 & n.4, 1327 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
212. Id. at 1322.
213. Regarding the lack of statutory authorization given to the NLRB to exercise jurisdiction
over parochial schools, see note 211 supra. There is a corresponding lack of legislative intent to
subject church schools to unemployment compensation taxes. See notes 108-19 & 123 and ac-
companying text supra.
214. Chief Justice Burger recognized that "[i]n enacting the National Labor Relations Act in
1935, Congress sought to protect the right of American workers to bargain collectively." 99 S.
Ct. at 1321. For a discussion of the generally positive effect of unemployment compensation
legislation on the American work force, see note 56 and accompanying text supra.
215. For example, "good faith" proceedings, discussed in the parochial school-NLRB cases,
and "good cause" determinations, presently being contested by Christian schools in the un-
employment compensation coverage cases, both involve similar instances of governmental over-
sight in evaluating the reasons for employee termination and both impose similar types of bur-
dens on the activities of church-related schools.
"Good faith" proceedings are formal determinations made by the NLRB in the context of
charges of unfair labor practices as to whether certain actions constitute firing for cause. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(a), 160(c) (1976). The object of the proceeding is to assure that an employee was
terminated for violating a legitimate employment standard and not for exercising any of his
rights under the NLRA. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1113, 1125 (7th
Cir. 1977), affd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979). Regarding the determinations which
the NLRB would have made as to the "good faith" of the parochial school administrator's deci-
sion to fire teachers for violating religious doctrines, the Seventh Circuit noted: "The scope of
this examination would necessarily include the validity as a part of church doctrine of the reason
given for the discharge." 559 F.2d at 1125. The Supreme Court in Catholic Bishop of Chicago
determined that "good cause" proceedings presented a "significant risk" of infringing the first
amendment rights of parochial schools. 99 S. Ct. at 1324.
Like "good faith" determinations, "good cause" proceedings under unemployment compen-
sation laws involve governmental oversight of the reasons for employee termination. Instead of
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the first inquiry is whether the activities of the agencies "presen[t] a signifi-
cant risk that the First Amendment will be infringed." 2 16  The Catholic
Bishop of Chicago Court indicated that it would consider two factors in de-
termining whether a school's religious freedoms had been infringed: 1)
whether the school may be characterized as sufficiently "religious" to war-
rant first amendment protection; 217 and 2) whether the exercise of the
school's religious mission would be burdened as a result of the administra-
tive action. 218
In considering the first factor, it is submitted that Christian schools typ-
ically meet the Court's criteria for religiosity 2 19 in that they integrate the
precepts of the Bible into all of their academic curriculum, 22 0 maintain high
religious standards for faculty members 2 2  and require students to partici-
pate in religious courses and activities on a regular basis. 2
2 2
With respect to the Court's second factor, 223 it is submitted that there
are several substantial burdens imposed on the religious activities of church
schools under the unemployment compensation laws.2 24 In addition to
being burdened by a tax liability 225 and by an obligation to submit extensive
records to the government,2 26 Christian schools may experience a substantial
burden from having to take part in "good cause litigation."'2 2 7 Because
being conducted by the NLRB in the context of unfair labor practice charges, "good cause"
proceedings are conducted by state employment security boards whenever an idled worker
seeking unemployment compensation benefits and his ex-employer disagree over whether the
grounds for the worker's termination of employment come within the statutory definition of
"good cause." See notes 101-07 and accompanying text supra. The federal court in Grace Breth-
ren Church v. California found "good cause" proceedings to be similar to the "good faith"
proceedings in Catholic Bishop of Chicago, and equally likely to cause unconstitutional entan-
glement between church and state. See notes 343 & 369 and accompanying text infra. For a
discussion of Grace Brethren, see notes 143-49 and accompanying text supra.
216. 99 S. Ct. at 1320.
217. Id. at 1319.
218. Id. at 1320.
219. Id. at 1319.
220. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
221. See notes 228-29 and accompanying text infra.
222. See P. KIENEL, supra note 20, at 71-76; P. KIENEL, supra note 29, at 125-43.
223. See text accompanying note 218 supra.
224. For an extended discussion of the burdens that unemployment compensation laws place
on Christian schools, see notes 318-48 and accompanying text infra.
225. For a discussion of the types of unemployment compensation tax liability to which
Christian schools may be subject, see notes 72-87 and accompanying text supra. Regarding the
burdening effect the taxes will have on the free exercise rights of Christian schools, see notes
318-33 and accompanying text infra.
226. For a discussion of the recordkeeping requirements imposed by the unemployment
compensation laws, see notes 88-95 and accompanying text supra. Regarding the inhibiting ef-
fect which these recordkeeping requirements have on the free exercise rights of Christian
schools, see notes 334-39 and accompanying text infra.
227. Concerning the tendency of the unemployment compensation laws to precipitate "good
cause" litigation, see notes 101-07 & 215 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the
burdens which "good cause" determinations will have on the religious mission of Christian
schools, see notes 340-43 and accompanying text infra.
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employees in Christian schools are hired partially on the basis of moral and
religious qualifications,2 2 8 and may be fired for violating the school's reli-
gious standards,2 29 such agency determinations will necessarily involve gov-
ernmental oversight of the reasons for a church school administrator's deci-
sion to fire an employee on religious grounds.2 30
It is submitted that a consideration of these two factors supports the
conclusion that, under the first inquiry of Catholic Bishop of Chicago, there
is a substantial risk that application of the unemployment compensation laws
to Christian schools will infringe upon their first amendment rights. Having
reached this conclusion, Catholic Bishop of Chicago requires a second in-
quiry: whether there exists any clear expression of an affirmative intention
by Congress that teachers in church-operated schools should be covered by
the unemployment compensation laws. 23 1
In determining whether the requisite congressional intent exists, it is
significant that neither FUTA nor its legislative history makes any specific,
express reference to church-related or religious schools. 232  Since the 1976
amendment to FUTA simply deleted the prior exclusion for elementary and
secondary schools,2 33 it is obviously mute on the issue of FUTA's applicabil-
ity to church-related schools. The Senate Report which accompanied the
228. See THE NAT'L OBSERVER, Jan. 15, 1977, at 18, cols. 1, 2. See also N.Y. Christian
School Memorandum, supra note 196, at 1-3, 6-8. In a case involving state accreditation of
Christian schools, a North Carolina court stated: "[Tihe defendant schools require that a person,
to be employed as a teacher therein, be a born again Christian of the fundamentalist Christian
faith and reflect Christian attitudes and values in his or her conduct both on the school premises
and in his or her personal life." North Carolina v. Columbus Christian Academy, No. 78 CVS
1678, slip op. at 13 (Super. Ct. Div., Wake County, N.C. Sept. 1, 1978).
229. See sources cited note 228 supra. In a memorandum to the New York Department of
Labor, attorneys for the New York Association of Christian Schools wrote: "In safeguarding the
integrity of the religious mission with which he is entrusted, a pastor must exercise the respon-
sibility of discharging teachers, and others, for religious or moral behavior which might, or
might not, meet the secular standard of 'misconduct'...... N.Y. Christian School Memoran-
dum, supra note 196, at 14.
230. The court in Grace Brethren stated:
[D]isputes unquestionably will arise in situations where employees are dismissed for cause
and the reason given by the church school is failure to adhere to religious tenets of the
church. The type of inquiry necessary to the resolution of controversies such as these is
almost identical to that which the Court found to involve dangers of excessive entangle-
ment in Catholic Bishop.
Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP, slip op. at 12
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979).
231. 99 S Ct. at 1320, 1321. See notes 210-12 and accompanying text supra.
232. A major impetus for eliminating the exemption in FUTA for school-related employment
was the concern expressed at the congressional hearings by national teachers' unions regarding
the rapidly increasing level of unemployment in the public schools. See notes 110-12 and ac-
companying text supra. No testimony was given at those hearings regarding any comparable
decrease in employment in religious schools. See sources cited note 111 supra. To the contrary,
the fact that Christian schools have rapidly increased in size and number in recent years, see
notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra, would indicate that employment opportunities are
expanding in church-related schools.
233. For a discussion of the 1976 amendment to § 3309 of FUTA, see notes 108-13 and
accompanying text supra.
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amendment 2 4 does little more than articulate the logical conclusion to be
deduced from the deletion of section 3309(b)(3): "The committee bill would
repeal this exclusion, thus requiring coverage for [nonprofit elementary and
secondary] schools on the same basis as it is required for other nonprofit
entities." 235
It is submitted that the language and history of section 3309 of FUTA
provide insight into the meaning of the quoted Senate language. Nonprofit
organizations, including all "religious, charitable [or] educational or-
ganization[s]," 236 have always been excluded from the federal unemploy-
ment tax. 237 In addition, FUTA did not require the states to include non-
profit organizations within the state unemployment laws until 1970.238 In
1970, Congress enacted FUTA section 3309, requiring state unemployment
compensation coverage of all nonprofit organizations except for those which
were specifically excluded thereunder-such as certain church-related and
educational organizations 2 3 9-and all nonprofit organizations with fewer
than four employees.2 40 The 1976 amendment deleting section 3309(b)(3)
evidences a clear congressional intent to require states to tax all nonprofit
elementary and secondary schools which looked solely to that section for
exclusion, including all public and many private schools. 24 x It is submitted,
however, that Congress did not intend to require state taxation of nonprofit
schools which had alternate grounds for exclusion besides being a primary or
secondary educational institution.
For instance, prior to the 1976 amendments, some Christian schools
might have been excluded from FUTA because they fit within all three of
the following categories: 1) a school under section 3309(b)(3); 2) a church-
related organization under section 3309(b)(1); and 3) an organization having
fewer than four employees under section 3309(c). It is clear that Christian
schools with fewer than four employees are still excluded by section
3309(c),2 42 even though an expansive reading of the above-quoted Senate
234. For a discussion of the Senate Report accompanying the 1976 amendments to FUTA,
see note 113 and accompanying text supra.
235. S. REP. No. 1265, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5997, 6006.
236. See I.R.C. § 3306(c)(8).
237. The original FUTA contained a very similar provision exempting nonprofit organizations.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 1426(b)(8), 53 Stat. 178 (now I.R.C. § 3306(c)(8)).
238. See Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP, slip
op. at 2 & n.6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979).
239. See generally notes 108-19 and accompanying text supra.
240. I.R.C. § 3309(c).
241. For the relevant text of the Senate Report construing the 1976 amendment, see note 113
supra.
242. Nonprofit organizations employing fewer than four employees are exempted by § 3309(c)
which provides in pertinent part: "This section shall not apply to service performed ... in the
employ of any [nonprofit] organization unless . . . the total number of individuals who were
employed by such organization . . . was 4 or more." I.R.C. § 3309(c).
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Report which speaks of nonprofit schools in general,2 43 would indicate a
congressional intent to tax all nonprofit schools, regardless of the size of their
staff. Just as the deletion of section 3309(b)(3) had no effect on the existing
3309(c) exception, it is submitted that the deletion of 3309(b)(3) had no effect
on the 3309(b)(1) "church" exception. It is further suggested that Congress
may have considered church-related schools to be independently excluded
by section 3309(b)(1) and, thus, unaffected by the deletion of 3309(b)(3).
Therefore, since Congress made no specific, express reference to
church-related schools when deleting section 3309(b)(3), and since there is a
substantial argument that church-related schools are independently excluded
from mandatory state unemployment compensation coverage by section
3309(b)(1),244 the required "clear expression of an affirmative intention of
Congress" that church-related schools should pay state unemployment taxes
appears to be lacking in the FUTA legislation.
This conclusion is buttressed by comparing the expression of congres-
sional intent in deleting section 3309(b)(3) of FUTA with that involved in the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) before the Court in Catholic Bishop of
Chicago. Unlike FUTA, the NLRA had never exempted nonprofit organiza-
tions generally from its coverage. 245  Although the NLRB and the courts
always assumed that the NLRB had jurisdiction over church schools,2 46 the
NLRB, in an exercise of its discretion, simply chose not to assert its jurisdic-
tion.2 47  Then, as the result of an administrative finding that parochial
schools were increasingly affecting interstate commerce,2 48 the NLRB de-
termined to exert jurisdiction over the schools. 24 9 Although parochial
schools technically came within the NLRA's definition of "employer," 250 and
although the NLRA contained no provision which even arguably excluded
such schools, 2 5 1 the Court nevertheless enjoined the NLRB from exercising
jurisdiction over parochial schools because Congress had not clearly ex-
pressed an affirmative intent to attain such a result. 25 2 It is submitted, there-
fore, that the congressional intent to subject church-related schools to un-
243. For the pertinent part of this Senate Report, see note 113 supra.
244. See notes 175-201 and accompanying text supra.
245. 99 S. Ct. at 1324 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A provision exempting nonprofit hospitals
was enacted in 1947 but deleted soon thereafter. Id. at 1325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 1325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 1325-26 & n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This interpretation of the NLRB's juris-
diction is corroborated by the fact that Congress specifically considered and rejected a proposed
amendment to the NLRA which would have excluded nonprofit organizations. See id. at 1325 &
n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 1317, 1325-26 & n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Cornell University, 183
N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
249. See Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). Regarding the NLRB's requirements
for exerting jurisdiction over parochial schools, see 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1979).
250. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976); 99 S. Ct. at 1324 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
251. See 99 S. Ct. at 1324 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 1322 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
COMMENT
33
Davis: Bringing Christian Schools within the Scope of the Unemployment C
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [
employment taxation is even less manifest than it was to bring parochial
schools within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
Insofar as application of the state unemployment compensation laws to
Christian schools threatens to infringe upon the first amendment free exer-
cise rights of these schools, and insofar as there is apparently no clear ex-
pression of an affirmative congressional intent to bring these schools under
the unemployment laws, it is submitted that the Catholic Bishop of Chicago
analysis indicates that the Labor Department's directive requiring state un-
employment compensation coverage of church schools is invalid. 253
B. Constitutional Grounds
1. Free Exercise-A Framework of Analysis
In considering the constitutionality 254 of subjecting Christian schools to
the unemployment compensation laws, it is suggested that a framework for
253. While invalidation of the Labor Department's directive would tend to cause the states to
voluntarily reinstate their prior exemptions for church-related schools, it is suggested that, ap-
plying the Catholic Bishop of Chicago test on the state level, no state employment security
agency may validly exercise jurisdiction over church-related schools unless the state legislature
expressly authorizes such action. For a discussion of the elements of the Catholic Bishop of
Chicago test, see notes 205-12, 216-18 & 231 and accompanying text supra. In a memorandum
to the New York Department of Labor, attorneys for the New York Association of Christian
Schools suggested a dual federal-state application of the Catholic Bishop of Chicago test to
invalidate the application of the unemployment compensation laws to Christian schools:
.'[N]either the Congress nor the New York legislature gave a 'clear expression of an affirmative
intention' to include teachers in church-operated schools under unemployment compensation
coverage." N.Y. Christian School Memorandum, supra note 196, at 24.
It appears that some state employment agencies are reconsidering their posture toward
church schools in the light of Catholic Bishop of Chicago. Recently, the Commissioner of Ten-
nessee's Department of Employment Security informed the United States Secretary of Labor
that, based on the Supreme Court's analysis in Catholic Bishop of Chicago, church schools in
Tennessee were not deemed by the state to come within the provisions of the Act. Commis-
sioner Bible stated in part:
[I]n view of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in the case of National
Labor Relations Board vs. the Catholic Bishop of Chicago, et al .. .and the interpreta-
tion of cases cited therein, it is the opinion of the Tennessee Department of Employment
Security that persons employed by a church, convention or association of churches, or an
organization operated primarily for religious purposes are excluded from coverage under
the Tennessee Employment Security Act .... Thus, if a primary or secondary school is
operated by a church, convention or association of churches, or an organization operated
primarily for religious purposes, and exhibits substantial religious activity and purpose, we
conclude that a person in the employ of such a church-related school is subject to the
exclusion ....
Letter from Robert T. Bible, Commissioner, Department of Employment Security of the State
of Tennessee, to the Honorable Ray Marshall, United States Secretary of Labor (April 12, 1979).
In addition, California has expressly indicated that it disagrees with the interpretation given
to FUTA § 3309 by the Department of Labor and has sided with Christian schools in litigation
to invalidate the tax. Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162
MRP, slip op. at 6, 7 (M.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979).
254. For the text cf the first amendment provisions applicable to the following discussion, see
note 1 supra.
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analysis may be fashioned from the Supreme Court's reasoning in Wisconsin
v. Yoder 255 taken in conjunction with prior cases which 1) distinguished
between direct and indirect burdens on religious practices; 25 6 2) focused on
governmental "entanglement" with religion; 25 7 and 3) dealt with the NLRB's
assertion of jurisdiction over Catholic schools. 25 8
In Yoder, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether Wis-
consin's compulsory school-attendance law unconstitutionally infringed upon
the rights of Amish parents to abide by their religious tradition of replacing
their children's formal high school education with informal, home-centered
education. 2 59  In holding that the law violated the free exercise rights of the
Amish parents, 26 0 the Court structured its analysis around a three-tiered in-
quiry: 261 1) whether the activity interfered with by the government is moti-
vated by and rooted in a legitimate and sincerely held religious belief; 262 2)
whether and to what extent the organization's religious free exercise rights
are being burdened or inhibited; 263 and 3) whether the governmental in-
255. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For a discussion of Yoder, see notes 259-70, & 279-92 and accom-
panying text infra.
256. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
For a discussion of these "direct-indirect burden" cases, see notes 271-80 and accompanying text
infra.
257. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 374 U.S. 664 (1970); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), affd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979). For a
discussion of the "excessive entanglement" factor, see notes 292-96 and accompanying text infra.
258. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), affd on other
grounds, 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979); McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. 1337 (M.D. Pa. 1978);
Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164 (E.D. Pa. 1977). For a discussion of the parochial school
labor cases, see notes 297-308 and accompanying text infra.
259. 406 U.S. at 207. The defendants had been fined five dollars each for violating the
compulsory-attendance law. Id. at 208. The defendants believed that in sending their children
to high school they would be subjecting themselves to the censure of the Amish community,
weakening the Amish community, and ultimately endangering the salvation of their own souls
and those of their children. Id. at 209.
260. Id. at 234.
261. The three-tiered inquiry in Yoder was not designated as a "test" by the Court. The
Supreme Court has never articulated a broadly applicable free exercise clause test or standard
for determining when governmental infringements of religious liberties violate the Constitution.
See Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164, 3169 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The cases arising under the
free exercise clause tend to be treated as unique, resulting in constitutional analysis that is
tailored to the special factual situations confronting the Court. Id. This approach is contrary to
the Court's approach in establishment clause cases, where a well-defined, broadly applicable
test has been enunciated. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1977); Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 748 (1976); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 613 (1971). However, due to
the factual and analytical similarities between Yoder and the Christian school unemployment
compensation cases, it is submitted that the Court would tend to follow the same approach in
the Christian school cases as it did in Yoder. The federal court in Caulfield stated that in Yoder,
"the Supreme Court has fashioned a loose analytical framework to guide the lower courts. That
model will be followed here, insofar as possible." 95 L.R.R.M. at 3171. The existence of this
framework was also noted in Comment, The Free Exercise Clause, the NLRA, and Parochial
School Teachers, 126 PA. L. REv. 631, 641 (1978).
262. 406 U.S. at 215-16.
263. Id. at 217-19.
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terests in regulation are sufficiently "compelling" to justify the burdening of
the organization's free exercise rights.2 64
With respect to the first prong, the Yoder Court stated that in order for
the Amish mode of education to be protected by the free exercise clause,
the religious faith of the Amish and their mode of life must be "inseparable
and interdependent." 26 5 The Court maintained that activity motivated solely
by philosophical or personal considerations is clearly outside the scope of
free exercise protection.2 66  In this case, however, the Court concluded that
"the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal
preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized
group, and intimately related to daily living." 267
Under Yoder's second prong, the Court determined that insofar as the
State compulsory-attendance law required the Amish to "perform acts unde-
niably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs," 2 68 its im-
pact on Amish religious practices was severe and inescapable. 269 The Yoder
Court's characterization of the law's impact as endangering the free exercise
rights of the Amish takes on particular significance in light of the distinction
drawn in prior cases between direct and indirect burdens on religious activ-
ity. 2
7 0
For instance, in Braunfeld v. Brown,271 the Court dealt with the claims
of Orthodox Jewish merchants that Pennsylvania's Sunday closing laws
violated their religious freedom by placing them at an economic disadvan-
tage with their non-Sabbatarian competitors. 272  The Court held that the
264. Id. at 219-34.
265. Id. at 215.
266. Id. at 216. The court in Yoder also took a realistic approach to the traditional "belief-
action" distinction in the area of religious free exercise. 406 U.S. at 220. Prior cases had held
that while religious beliefs were constitutionally protected from state interference, actions moti-
vated by those beliefs were not immune from governmental regulation. See Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). In Yoder, Chief Justice
Burger stated:
To agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad police
power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to
control, even under regulations of general applicability.
406 U.S. at 220.
267. Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
268. 406 U.S. at 218.
269. Id.
270. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,
606-07 (1961). For a discussion of Sherbert, see notes 275-78 and accompanying text infra. For a
discussion of Braunfeld, see notes 271-74 and accompanying text infra. Governmental regulation
which actually probihits a given exercise of religious belief is considered to be a "direct bur-
den," whereas a regulation which merely makes the exercise of religion more difficult or expen-
sive is considered to be an "indirect burden." See Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164, 3171
(E.D. Pa. 1977).
271. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
272. Id. at 601-02.
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Sunday closing laws were valid 273 since their effect on religious activity was
only indirect.274  Similarly, in Sherbert v. Verner,2 75 the Court considered
whether a state could constitutionally disqualify a Seventh-day Adventist
from receiving unemployment compensation benefits because her religiously
motivated refusal to work on Saturday caused her to fail the statutory re-
quirement of being "available for work." 2 76  Although the Sherbert Court
did not find the burden caused by the state action to be "direct," 27 7 it
nevertheless held that the state unconstitutionally violated the petitioner's
free exercise rights. 2 78 Based on the direct-indirect burden analysis of
Braunfeld and Sherbert, it is clear that the compulsory-attendance statute in
Yoder constituted a direct burden 2 79 on religion, since it penalized the
specific activity which the Amish believed to be religiously required. 280
Yoder's third tier involved a balancing test, wherein the Court weighed
the state interests in the regulation 28 ' against the interests of the Amish in
exercising their religious practices. 28 2 The Yoder Court determined that the
state interests were not sufficiently "compelling" to justify burdening the
religious practices of the Amish. 283  In reaching this conclusion, the Court
273. Id. at 609.
274. Id. at 605-09.
275. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
276. Id. at 399-401.
277. In Sherbert, Justice Brennan stated: "In a sense the consequences of [the plaintiff's
disqualification from unemployment benefits] to religious principles and practices may only be
an indirect result of welfare legislation within the State's general competence to enact .... "
374 U.S. at 403 (emphasis added). While the state regulation in Sherbert did not place a direct
burden on the plaintiffs Saturday worship, it did have the effect of making it significantly more
costly, since the plaintiff was forced to forfeit benefits. Id. at 404. The Braunfeld Court had
refused to find that making religious exercise more costly was in itself unconstitutional. See 366
U.S. at 605. However, the Sherbert Court distinguished Braunfeld on the basis that the state
interest involved in Braunfeld-providing "one uniform day of rest for all workers"-was far
more compelling than the state interest in Sherbert--maintaining the integrity of the un-
employment fund by disqualifying some workers from unemployment benefits because of their
religiously motivated refusal to work. 374 U.S. at 408-09.
278. 374 U.S. at 409-10. The general principal deducible from Braunfeld and Sherbert ap-
pears to be that while a governmental infringement of religious exercise may be invalidated by
the Court whether it is direct or indirect, the Court will invalidate direct burdens more readily.
In a case involving a direct burden on religious belief, the Court would require a "more par-
ticularized showing from the State" of an overriding interest. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
at 227, 236.
279. The Yoder Court found that "[t]he impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respon-
dents' practice of the Amish religion is not onlylsevere, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law
affirmatively compels them, under threat of cripninal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at
odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs." 406 U.S. at 218.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 219-30. The state's basic contentions were that 1) "some degree of education
is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in an open political
system if we are to preserve our freedom and independence"; and 2) "education prepares indi-
viduals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society." Id. at 221. Although the
Court agreed that these state interests were important, it did not find them "compelling" in the
Yoder case. Id.
282. Id. at 224-28.
283. Id. at 235-36. The third level of inquiry, assessing governmental interests and
balancing them against the competing constitutionai claims of the individual or group, has long
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indicated that the history and tradition of a religious organization may be
weighty factors in the balancing process. 284 The Court extensively consid-
ered the history of the Amish people,2 8 5 noting that their religiously moti-
vated practices have pervaded their culture for centuries. 28 6  Thus, Yoder
suggests that prohibiting or burdening long-established religious traditions is
a far more serious infringement of free exercise rights than prohibiting re-
cently initiated religious activity, 28 7 particularly when the government has
historically maintained a neutral policy with respect to the religious practice
in question. 288
One federal court applying Yoder to a free exercise case noted that the
Court has apparently utilized a "sliding scale balancing test" 28 9 in weighing
the competing interests of the religious organization and the government.
The scale "slides" in that the greater the burden the regulation places on the
exercise of religion, the stronger the provable governmental interest must be
in order for the regulation to pass constitutional muster.29 0 The Supreme
been utilized by the Court in the area of first amendment fundamental freedoms. For first
amendment symbolic speech cases involving a balancing approach, see Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405 (1974); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 369 (1968).
In Yoder, Chief Justice Burger stated: "We must searchingly examine the interests that the
State seeks to promote by its requirement for compulsory education to age 16, and the impedi-
ment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish exemption." 406
U.S. at 221. In its conclusion, the Court suggested that "courts must move with great cir-
cumspection in performing the sensitive and delicate task of weighing a State's legitimate social
concern when faced with religious claims for exemption from generally applicable educational
requirements." Id. at 235.
284. See 406 U.S. at 209-13, 225-27.
285. Id. at 209-12, 216-19, 222-27. Chief Justice Burger noted that "the Amish communities
singularly parallel and reflect many of the virtues of Jefferson's ideal of the 'sturdy yeoman' who
would form the basis of what he considered as the ideal of a democratic society." Id. at 225-26.
286. Id. at 225. The Court frequently referred to the centuries of religious practice and the
highly developed community life of the Amish, which would be seriously threatened by forcing
the Amish to comply with the compulsory school attendance laws. Id. at 215-19, 226-27. The
Court declared that the state's interest in equipping its citizens with the level of education it
determined to be necessary for good citizenship could not outweigh the strong historical show-
ing of "[t]he independence and successful social functioning of the Amish community for a
period approaching almost three centuries and more than 200 years in this country." Id. at
226-27. See also id. at 235.
287. See note 257 supra. Apparently attempting to caution newly formed religious groups
against seeking exemption from governmental programs, Chief Justice Burger wrote: "It cannot
be overemphasized that we are not dealing with a way of life and mode of education by a group
claiming to have recently discovered some progressive or more enlightened process for rearing
children for modern life." 406 U.S. at 235.
288. The Yoder Court observed that Congress does not require groups such as the Amish to
pay social security taxes because the Amish make their own provisions for their dependent
members. Id. at 222 n.11. The Court also noted that several states had "adopted plans to
accommodate Amish religious beliefs through the establishment of an 'Amish vocational
school.' " Id. at 236 n.23. Moreover, the Court noted that, since the inception of the nation,
the sect had been a "successful and self-sufficient segment of American society." Id. at 235.
289. See Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164, 3170-71 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
290. Id. at 3171.
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Court has also indicated that the free exercise scale is weighted in favor of
the organization asserting infringement of its religious freedoms: "[I]n this
highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interest, give occasion to permissible limitation.' "291
The Supreme Court has indicated that, in addition to the three prongs
of the Yoder analysis, there is another factor relevant to free exercise cases
which focuses on the "excessive entanglement" between the government and
religious organizations. 292 Although the "excessive entanglement" test was
developed in establishment clause cases, 293 it is submitted that it is equally
applicable to free exercise cases because it goes to the heart of the "general
principle deducible [from the religion clause decisions] . . . that [the Court]
will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental
interference with religion." 294  Support for the conclusion that the entan-
glement factor is relevant in free exercise cases is found in Catholic Bishop of
Chicago.295 With respect to the free exercise issues raised by the NLRB's
291. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 406 (1963), quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
530 (1945).
292. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 697 (1970). In Walz, Chief Justice Burger
enunciated the entanglement test as follows: "We must also be sure that the end result-the
effect [of the legislation]-is not an excessive government entanglement with religion. The test is
inescapably one of degree." Id. (emphasis added).
293. For examples of recent cases dealing with the question of whether state aid to primary
and secondary religious schools violates the establishment clause because of "excessive entan-
glement," see generally Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
294. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). One court stated that the essence of the
entanglement factor is that "secular and religious authorities should not and cannot constitution-
ally interfere with, the other's respective sphere of autonomy." McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F.
Supp. 1337, 1357 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
Prior to Catholic Bishop of Chicago, see notes 295-96 and accompanying text infra, there
had been some uncertainty in the lower courts as to whether the Burger Court's "excessive
entanglement" factor is applicable only in establishment clause cases, where it developed, or
whether it is also applicable in free exercise cases. For instance, in order to reach the "excessive
entanglement" analysis, the courts in both Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164, 3178-79
(E.D. Pa. 1977), and McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. 1337, 1356-58 (M.D. Pa. 1978), found
it necessary to invalidate the NLRB's assertion of jurisdiction over parochial schools on the basis
of the establishment clause as well as the free exercise clause. It is submitted, however, that it
is theoretically unsound to invalidate burdensome governmental regulations on the basis of the
establishment clause, which was created to "insure that no religion be sponsored or favored. "
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 669 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Supreme Court has
never invalidated governmental activity on both religion clauses, preferring to view them as
separate and distinct. See Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 3, 15 (1978). Thus, in dealing
with the constitutionality of the governmental regulation of religious schools, it is submitted that
"excessive entanglement" should be treated as one factor under the free exercise analysis, not as
creating a separate establishment violation. Support for this position is provided in dictum in
Catholic Bishop of Chicago. See notes 295-96 and accompanying text infra.
295. For a discussion of Catholic Bishop of Chicago, see notes 205-12 and accompanying text
supra.
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assertion of jurisdiction over parochial schools, the Catholic Bishop of
Chicago Court declared:
Good intentions by government-or third parties-can surely no
more avoid entanglement with the religious mission of the schools
in the setting of mandatory collective bargaining than in the well
motivated legislative efforts consented to by the church-operated
schools which we found unacceptable in Lemon, Meek, and Wol-
man [all dealing with the establishment clause]. 296
Finally, it is submitted that a court reaching the constitutional grounds
of a Christian school unemployment compensation case would find persua-
sive the free exercise discussions of three lower courts in the factually similar
parochial school-NLRB cases 29 7 which culminated with the Supreme Court's
decision in Catholic Bishop of Chicago.2 98  In each of the three cases,
Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 299 Caulfield v. Hirsch,30 0 and
McCormick v. Hirsch,30 1 the courts found that the administration of the
NLRA by the NLRB in the context of church schools 30 2 was unconstitutional
in that the Act's provisions both impinged upon the free exercise rights of
the schools 3 3 and created an "excessive entanglement" of church and
296. 99 S. Ct. at 1319. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 370 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971).
297. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd on other
grounds, 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979); McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. 1337 (M.D. Pa. 1978);
Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164 (E.D. Pa. 1977). For a discussion of the facts of these
three cases and their similarities to the Christian school unemployment compensation cases, see
notes 299-302 and accompanying text infra.
298. 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979). In Catholic Bishop of Chicago, Chief Justice Burger did not state
that the court of appeals erred in disposing of the case on constitutional grounds. Indeed, the
Chief Justice referred extensively to the free exercise portions of the lower court's opinion. See
id. at 1316-17, 1320.
299. 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), affd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979). For the
facts of the Catholic Bishop of Chicago case, see notes 205-10 and accompanying text supra.
300. 95 L.R.R.M. 3164 (E.D. Pa. 1977). In Caulfield, a Catholic lay teachers' union filed a
petition with the NLRB seeking to be certified as the teachers' exclusive bargaining representa-
tive for purposes of carrying on collective bargaining with the "employer." Id. at 3165. The
NLRB issued an opinion stating that the Archdiocese was the employer of the lay teachers and
that all full-time lay teachers in the elementary schools constituted an appropriate bargaining
unit. Id. at 3165-66. It was implicit in the NLRB's decision that the NLRB would order an
election to allow the teachers to determine their representative. Id. The Archdiocese brought
suit in district court seeking both preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent the NLRB
from causing an election to be held. Id.
301. 460 F. Supp. 1337 (M.D. Pa. 1978). The McCormick case involved facts nearly identical
to Caulfield, and was also brought in the federal district court seeking injunctive relief prior to a
final administrative order. See 460 F. Supp. at 1340. See also Comment, supra note 261.
302. The Christian school unemployment compensation cases, like the parochial school-
NLRB cases, deal with the administrative interpretation of a federal act (FUTA), by a federal
agency (the Department of Labor), in the context of church-related schools. See notes 120-28
and accompanying text supra. Even the nature of the burdens imposed by the two acts on the
decisionmaking process of church school administrators is similar. See note 343 and accompany-
ing text infra. It is submitted that the similarities between the Christian school unemployment
cases and the parochial school labor cases tend to make the constitutional analysis of the latter
applicable and influential in deciding the former.
303. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1124-31; McCormick v. Hirsch, 460
F. Supp. at 1352-58; Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3175-80.
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state. 30 4  Utilizing an approach similar to that of the Court in Yoder, 30 5 the
lower courts found that 1) the parochial schools were a legitimate exercise of
a genuine religious belief; 306 2) the application of the NLRA to the schools
inhibited the exercise of religious endeavors; 307 and 3) the interests of the
schools in remaining outside the scope of the NLRA outweighed the interest
of the government in bringing them within it. 30 8
2. An Application of The Free Exercise Analysis To Unemployment Compen-
sation Coverage of Christian Schools
a. Christian School Education as an Exercise of a
Genuine Religious Belief
304. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1121, 1128 ("we have difficulty in
finding avoidance of entanglement"); McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. at 1357 ("the kind of
entanglement involved in the instant case is administrative entanglement"); Caulfield v. Hirsch,
95 L.R.R.M. at 3178-79 ("the entangling relationships which can arise under the NLRA appear
in a wide variety of ways").
305. Regarding the Yoder approach to adjudication of free exercise claims, see notes 259-64
and accompanying text supra.
306. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1121-22; McCormick v. Hirsch, 460
F. Supp. at 1352-53; Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3171-72, 3176.
307. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1123-26; McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F.
Supp. at 1353-56; Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3176-78.
308. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1130-31; McCormick v. Hirsch, 460
F. Supp. at 1356; Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3178. It is submitted that several impor-
tant principles applicable to the Christian school unemployment compensation cases may be
deduced from the Catholic school labor cases. First, the cases indicate a willingness on the part
of the courts to grant the religious schools substantially the status of a "church" with respect to
protecting their religious freedoms. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at
1119-22; McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. at 1352-53; Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. at
3171-72. Second, according to these cases, the government may be prohibited from regulating
religious schools even if the regulatory program is of a general and nondiscriminatory nature.
See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 114; Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. at
3176. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220. Third, courts are willing to look beyond the
facial provisions of a regulatory program to determine the extent to which the regulation, as
applied to a religious school, will infringe or burden the school's religious activities. See
Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1123-25; Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. at
3176-79. Fourth, it is evident from the Catholic school labor cases that even federal programs
which are firmly rooted in important national policies and which have a history of continuously
expanding coverage will be prohibited from entering the domain of religious schools if substan-
tial infringement of the schools' religious freedoms would be the likely result. See Catholic
Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1130; McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. at 1357;
Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3172, 3176. The infringement must be "substantial" be-
cause "[g]overnment regulation which effects [sic] religious activity is inevitable in this day and
age; a total separation of church and state is not possible." Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. at
3178. Fifth, the cases indicate that the religious rights of the schools will be upheld even
though employees of the school, or others closely associated with it, will be affected adversely.
McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. at 1350, 1358; Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3176,
3178. Finally, the cases demonstrate a remarkable propensity of the courts to break with estab-
lished procedure and utilize extraordinary remedies to enjoin the government from putting into
effect a regulatory program. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d at 1116-19, 1130-31;
McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. at 1348; Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3166-69,
3180. For a discussion of how the Grace Brethren court overcame serious procedural obstacles
to entertain jurisdiction of that Christian school unemployment compensation case, see notes
143-46 and accompanying text supra.
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In applying the free exercise analysis set out above, it would appear that
Christian schools pass the first prong of Yoder 30 9 in that they tend to be run
by churches 3 10 or religiously motivated parents 3 11 as an exercise and out-
growth of legitimate and sincerely held religious beliefs. 312  Although the
remarkable growth in Christian school education has been fairly recent,
313
Christian schools in the United States have a heritage that dates back to the
colonial era. 314  Because parents and teachers who become involved in
Christian education are often motivated by perceived Scriptural mandates to
teach children in accordance with the Bible, 3 15 the schools attempt to
integrate Scriptural principles into all aspects of education.
3 16
b. The Burdening Effect of the Unemployment Compensation Laws
on the Religious Mission of Christian Schools
Proceeding to the second prong of Yoder, 3 17 there are substantial indi-
cations that the administration of the unemployment compensation laws will
have a material impact on the exercise of the religious beliefs of the adminis-
trators, teachers, parents, and children associated with Christian schools.
The most obvious effect that the unemployment compensation laws have had
on Christian schools is the imposition of a tax burden. 3 18  For example, the
309. For the first prong of the Yoder Court's three-tiered free exercise analysis, see note 262
supra.
310. For a discussion of church-operated Christian schools, see notes 25-32 and accompanying
text supra.
311. For a discussion of parent-operated Christian schools, see note 26 and accompanying text
supra.
312. Regarding the religious underpinnings of Christian schools, see notes 17-21 and accom-
panying text supra. The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, found parochial schools to be
pervasively religious. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon,
413 U.S. 825, 830 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613-18, 657 (1971). See also
McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. at 1352-53; Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3171-72.
Many of the aspects of the parochial schools which led the Court to conclude that they are
"pervasively religious" are also found in Christian schools. For example, with respect to the
parents and administrators of one Christian school, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "[T]hese
appellants are God-fearing people with an abiding religious conviction that Biblical training is
essential to the proper inculcation of spiritual and moral values into their youth." State v.
Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 200, 351 N.E.2d 750, 762 (1962).
313. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
314. P. KIENEL, supra note 20, at 96. See note 20 supra.
315. See Dueteronomy 6:5-9; Proverbs 1:7, 22:6; notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
316. See R. LOWmE, TO THOSE WHO TEACH IN CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS 11-17 (1978); notes
27-29 and accompanying text supra.
317. For the second prong of the Yoder Court's three-tiered free exercise analysis, see note
263 and accompanying text supra.
318. For a discussion of the types and amount of unemployment compensation taxes, see
notes 72-87 and acebmpanying text supra. One of the original justifications for requiring profit-
making organizations to pay unemployment taxes while exempting nonprofit organizations was
that profitmaking organizations could pass along the cost to the consumer in the form of higher
prices as a legitimate "business expense," whereas nonprofit organizations, dependent largely on
charitable contributions, could only cover the cost by increased donations. Witte, The Essentials
of Unemployment Compensation, 25 NAT'L MUN. REV. 157, 160, 161 (1936). Moreover, Con-
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Quaker school in Germantown Friends School v. Joseph,319 was assessed
contributions in the amount of $16,800 for a single year. 320 While under
the elective reimbursement method of payment 321 a school will not incur a
tax liability in a year of full employment, 322 the school is exposed to a risk of
considerably higher reimbursement liability in the event of numerous
layoffs.3 23  While some schools are probably capable of surviving the new
tax, it is conceivable that other schools, already hovering on the brink of
insolvency, may actually be forced into bankruptcy as a result of FUTA. 32
4
This is particularly true of a school which elects to make reimbursements
and then, due to an unexpected need to lay off numerous employees, be-
comes liable for contributions beyond its capacity to pay. 325
This potential liability could, it is suggested, instill in administrators of
Christian schools which have chosen the reimbursement mode of pay-
ment 326 a reluctance to hire additional faculty.327 For those schools not
electing the reimbursement mode, payment of the standard unemployment
tax will cause a reduction in the amount of funds available for new salaries.
Limiting the employment of new teachers tends to necessitate a reduction in
the enrollment of new students, 328 which in turn tends to diminish the in-
come needed to fund building programs and curricula improvements.3 29
gress has recognized the unique dependency of nonprofit organizations on gifts (as opposed to
sales) which constitute the primary source of their income. S. REP. No. 752, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 14, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3606, 3618.
319. No. 79-1539 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1979).
320. Brief for Plaintiff at 3, Germantown Friends School v. Joseph, No. 79-1539 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 6, 1979).
321. For a discussion of the reimbursement method of unemployment compensation pay-
ments, see notes 78-87 and accompanying text supra.
322. See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra.
323. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
324. Attorney William Ball, representing the Association of Christian Schools International at
a public hearing on Proposed Revenue Procedure 4830-01 (relating to the tax-exempt status of
private schools), stated with respect to the financial strength of Christian schools:
I know of no religious school today which has a nickle to spare. Their resources are only
as deep as their parishioners' pockets. The schools I represent are all relatively small
schools. They are not publicly funded; the parents who enroll their children there typi-
cally do so at great personal sacrifice. They already pay public school taxes.
Public Hearing on Proposed Revenue Proc. 4830-01 on Private Schools, Wash., D.C., Dec. 5,
1978, at 10 (testimony of William B. Ball, Esq.).
325. Concerning the threat of enormous contribution liability during a period of massive
layoffs, see note 87 and accompanying text supra.
326. See notes 78-87 and accompanying text supra.
327. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
328. Numerous studies in the field of education have concluded that the teacher-student ratio
in elementary and secondary classes should not exceed one teacher per 15 to 30 students,
depending upon the nature of the subject matter and the age of the children. See generally
Bozzomo, Does Class Size Matter?, 57 NAT'L ELEM. PRINCIPAL 78-81 (Jan. 1978); Nelson,
What's Happening with Class Size?, 124 PA. SCHOOL J. 118-20 (Mar. 1976).
329. Regarding the expense of expanding and upgrading Christian schools, see generally
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, May 5, 1978, at 21-22; THE NAT'L OBSERVER, Jan. 15, 1977, at 18; U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 8, 1973, at 45-46. Many Christian schools in the past decade
have experienced exceptional growth. See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra. The
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Furthermore, unemployment compensation taxes burden the parents and
church members who sponsor the schools and who ultimately provide the
additional tuition and gifts necessary to pay the taxes. 330  Since educational
costs tend to be rising more rapidly than personal income, 331 and since
Christian school parents must also pay public school taxes, 332 there is no
assurance that the increased burden can be met by increased giving. This
constriction of the growth of Christian schools, it is submitted, constitutes a
particularly serious burden to the schools under the second prong of Yoder
because the administrators of many Christian schools believe that they are
commanded by Scripture to increase in size and number in order to serve all
parents desirous of giving their children a Christian education. 333
In addition to paying unemployment taxes, Christian schools are re-
quired by the unemployment compensation statutes to keep extensive
records regarding their organization and its employees. 334  Since FUTA only
requires coverage of employees who spend more than one half of their time
engaged in nonexempt services, 335 the schools will be required to deter-
growth of recently established Christian schools is often achieved by adding new grades over a
period of time. The addition of a new grade frequently involves a risk on the part of the
administration since a new teacher must often be hired before enough enrollment interest has
been displayed in a new grade to economically justify its addition. By requiring reimbursement
payment of a school which lays off a teacher in a situation where the addition of a new grade
proved to be premature, it could be argued that the state is penalizing an error in the adminis-
trator's judgment, and chilling his inclination to expand the size of the school.
330. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 8, 1973, at 46.
331. Regarding the soaring cost of education, one source has noted:
In the last seven years the cost of educating a public school student has doubled. Accord-
ing to a nationwide survey of school-district budgets conducted by Market Research Re-
trieval, an education-research company based in Westport, Connecticut, the average
cost of educating a student in the nation's public schools rose from $553.95 during the
1967-68 school year to $1,108.22 during 1974-75.
P. KIENEL, supra note 16, at 99. During a comparable time period, average weekly earnings in
private nonagricultural establishments, manufacturing, and trade rose from $95.00 in 1965 to
$138.00 in 1972. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND
EARNINGS, vol. 19, No. 4, at 27 (Oct. 1972).
332. The seeming inequity of requiring parents-who pay tuition to send their children to
private schools-to also pay public school taxes has led some states to pass tuition tax deduc-
tions. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:3-1 (West Supp. 1977) (declared unconstitutional); Act
of May 22, 1972, ch. 414, §§ 3-5, 1972 N.Y. Laws 887-88 (to amend N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(c), (j))
(McKinney Supp. 1972-73) (declared unconsitutional). For the most part, these state income tax
deductions have failed to survive constitutional challenges in the courts. See Committee for
Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d
514 (1979).
333. P. KIENEL, supra note 20, at 9-10, 19, 71-72; P. KIENEL, supra note 29, at 1-3.
334. Regarding the recordkeeping requirements imposed by the unemployment compensa-
tion laws, see notes 88-100 and accompanying text supra. The Grace Brethren court, in assess-
ing the burdening effect of the laws on Christian schools, noted that records for each employee
must be maintained regarding the hours worked, the wages paid, and, in cases where the
employee serves both the church and the school, the exact proportion spent working for each.
See Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP, slip op. at
10-11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979).
335. I.R.C. § 3306(d).
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mine, and the state will be required to investigate, what percentage of an
employee's time is spent serving the church directly, and what percentage is
spent serving the school. 336  The laws also throw open to governmental
scrutiny many other records in the Christian schools which were previously
immune from such investigation. 337 Since the records must be detailed,
accurate, retained over a long period, and open to inspection at any time, 338
larger Christian schools may be required to employ trained personnel to
compile the data, and to obtain additional facilities to store it.339 In sum,
the recordkeeping provisions will tend to infringe upon the privacy of the
schools, will require the expenditure of money, and will use up a good deal
of time and space, thus imposing substantial burdens upon the religious mis-
sion of Christian schools.
A third serious impact of the unemployment compensation laws on
Christian schools is the tendency of the laws to draw schools into litigation
over the issue of whether employment was terminated for "good cause." 340
For a Christian school electing the reimbursement method of payment, 34 1
"good cause determinations" could seriously affect the school's financial
status because if the school prevails, it pays nothing; but if it loses, full
reimbursement is required. 342 In this regard, "good cause" determinations
could chill a Christian school administrator's Scripturally based decision to
fire a teacher for engaging in or advocating such secularly acceptable conduct
as smoking, the consumption of alcoholic beverages, the use of profanity, or
extramarital sex. 343  In essence, "good cause" litigation would require the
336. Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP, slip op. at
11-12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979).
337. Christian schools have asserted that the unemployment compensation laws have re-
quired the schools to keep records and divulge information to an extent never previously man-
dated. See id. at 13. Brief for Petitioner at 36, Germantown Friends School v. Pennsylvania
Dep't of Labor and Indus., No. 940 (Pa. Commw. Ct., filed Oct. 12, 1979); N.Y. Christian
Schools Memorandum, supra note 196, at 21-22.
338. See notes 88-100 and accompanying text supra.
339. See note 337 and accompanying text supra.
340. For a discussion of "good cause" litigation, see notes 100-07 & 215 and accompanying
text supra.
341. Regarding the election of reimbursement unemployment compensation payments, see
notes 78-82 and accompanying text supra.
342. See notes 79 & 87 and accompanying text supra.
343. The district court in Grace Brethren stated that
disputes unquestionably will arise in situations where employees are dismissed for cause
and the reason given by the church school is failure to adhere to religious tenets of the
church.
The type of inquiry necessary to the resolution of controversies such as these is
almost identical to that which the court found to involve dangers of excessive entangle-
ment in Catholic Bishop. . . . Such an inquiry, taken by itself, involves impermissible
entanglement of the state with the church, violative of the separation of those entities
mandated by the Constitution.
Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP, slip op. at 12
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979). For a discussion of the necessary qualifications for teachers in Chris-
tian schools, see notes 197-98 and accompanying text supra. In Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the
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government to decide whether a Christian school's action, taken on the basis
of Biblical standards, is "just" under the prevailing standards of the state
labor bureau.
The foregoing burdens imposed by FUTA on Christian schools may ini-
tially appear to be indirect in nature,34 since the Labor Department has not
stated that the Christian schools cannot continue to operate and carry on
their religious mission but has, instead, made such exercise more costly. It
could be argued that this factor of indirectness may place the Christian
school unemployment cases outside the scope of the Yoder analysis, in that
the proposed governmental action in Yoder would have had an immediate
and direct impact on the actual participation of children in the traditional
Amish educational process. 345 It is submitted, however, that if the taxation
imposed by FUTA tends to force some Christian schools to close, or
significantly inhibits their growth, the burden on the schools could reasona-
bly be considered direct. In Braunfeld, for instance, the burden that the
Court characterized as indirect was the tendency of the Sunday trading laws
to place Jewish merchants at a severe economic disadvantage, possibly forc-
ing them out of business. 346 However, the business carried on by the plain-
tiffs in Braunfeld was not primarily religious,3 47 as is the case with Christian
schools. 348  In this respect, it is suggested that taxing Christian schools into
insolvency would constitute a direct burden on religious activity by causing
that activity to cease, thus bringing the controversy within the scope of the
Yoder analysis.
c. Balancing the Interests of the Government and the Schools
The third level of inquiry under the Yoder analysis-i.e., whether the
state's interest is sufficiently compelling to overcome the infringement of
religion-presents the greatest problems of valuation and prediction.3 4 9
The governmental interest in protecting employees from the ravages of un-
employment is undeniably strong. Most observers agree that FUTA has gen-
erally been successful in ameliorating the effects of unemployment on indi-
Seventh Circuit noted that three unfair labor practice charges had been filed with the Board
regarding the firing of lay teachers in the parochial schools for violating the tenets of the
Catholic church. 559 F.2d at 1125. The grounds for the terminations were 1) teaching the sexual
theories of Masters and Johnson; 2) marrying a divorced Catholic; and 3) refusing to structure a
religion course as directed by the principal and the chairman of the religion department. Id.
344. For a discussion of the constitutional distinction between direct and indirect burdens on
religious exercise, see notes 270-80 and accompanying text supra.
345. See notes 279-80 and accompanying text supra.
346. 366 U.S. 599, 601 (1961). For a discussion of Braunfeld, see notes 271-74 and accom-
panying text supra.
347. The Braunfeld Court stated: "[T]he statute at bar does not make unlawful any religious
practices of appellants; the Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity .... 366 U.S. at 605
(emphasis added).
348. See notes 27-29 & 310-16 and accompanying text supra.
349. See notes 281-91 and accompanying text supra.
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viduals in America, 350 and the pressures are great to extend its coverage to
as many workers as possible. 351 However, it is submitted that in the context
of extending unemployment compensation coverage to Christian school
employees, neither the government's interests in protecting the unemployed
individual 352 nor its interests in protecting national economic stability 353 are
"compelling."
With respect to the governmental interest in protecting the welfare of
unemployed workers individually, there were no indications at the congres-
sional hearings on the 1976 FUTA amendments that any significant un-
employment problems exist in Christian schools. 35 4  In fact, given the re-
cent rise in the number and size of Christian schools, 355 it would seem that
teaching positions in these schools would be increasing, not decreasing.
While the government may contend that unemployment in the Christian
schools may become a serious problem in the future, it is submitted that a
contingent or anticipated interest should not be considered "compelling" for
purposes of this first amendment balancing approach.
Turning to the governmental interest of protecting the national
economy, it is submitted that exempting Christian schools from FUTA poses
no threat to the national economy because employment in Christian schools
is stable and because Christian school employees constitute only a minute
percentage of the total work force. 356 With respect to the government in
terests in maximizing the solvency and effectiveness of the unemployment
funds, the fact that Congress exempted nonprofit organizations from the fed-
eral tax 357 and permitted them to pay reimbursements to the state funds,
35 8
indicates that the congressional motivation for extending FUTA coverage to
nonprofit organizations was primarily a desire to assist the unemployed of
350. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
351. See notes 50-56 and accompanying text supra.
352. See notes 53-54 and accompanying text supra.
353. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
354. See sources cited note 111 supra. Ironically, some of the very same Christian school
employees that the FUTA amendments were designed to protect are opposed to it. The com-
plaint in Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP (C.D.
Cal., Sept. 21, 1979) includes several teachers as plaintiffs. Id., Complaint at 5-6. Furthermore,
Christian school teachers may believe that, due to the private source of funding of their schools,
a financially healthy and growing school is a better guarantee of employment security than
government-sponsored unemployment compensation. Similarly, the teachers may have a dedica-
tion to the schools that transcends their own economic needs. See P. KIENEL, supra note 20, at
109-15.
355. See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra.
356. The Labor Department's figure for the total number of employees in all nonprofit (in-
cluding private, parochial, and Christian) schools is 242,000. Conformity Proceeding-Decision
of the Secretary, supra note 50, at 10. See also S. REP. No. 1265, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 8,
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5997, 6004.
357. See note 166 and accompanying text supra.
358. See notes 78-80 and accompanying text supra.
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those organizations,3 59 and that the issue of the solvency and funding of the
state programs was not a factor.
3 60
It is therefore submitted that, in light of the serious infringement of
religious practice caused by extending FUTA coverage to Christian
schools, 361 and due to the lack of clearly compelling governmental interests
in so extending FUTA, 3 6 2 the balance in the unemployment cases should be
struck in favor of the Christian schools.
36 3
d. Excessive Entanglement
It is submitted that the application of FUTA to Christian schools consti-
tutes "excessive governmental entanglement" in the affairs of religious or-
ganizations. 364 As was true with respect to the NLRB in Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, the state unemployment boards are required to oversee and inter-
vene in the day-to-day operations of the schools. 3 6 5 The state agencies have
broad subpoena and investigatory powers over the affairs and records of the
Christian schools. 366 Where church schools have employees who also serve
the church, the state will be required to make and enforce guidelines to aid
school administrators in the difficult determination as to what percentage of
employment is "secular" and covered by the law, versus what portion is
excluded as being sufficiently "religious." 36 7 Moreover, in many instances
359. See notes 110-13 and accompanying text supra.
360. It is clear that Congress anticipated that the cost of the coverage of nonprofit schools
would be largely paid for out of general federal revenues and that the schools would not "pay
their own way." S. REP. No. 1265, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 11, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5997, 6004.
361. See notes 318-43 and accompanying text supra.
362. See notes 349-60 and accompanying text supra.
363. This conclusion is buttressed by the Yoder Court's suggestion that the interests of the
government in a given regulation must reach extraordinary proportions before the government
may validly destroy a religious privilege rooted in centuries of tradition. 406 U.S. at 235-36. See
notes 283-88 and accompanying text supra. An examination of the history of Christian schools
reveals that they are firmly grounded in a tradition of Christian education that predates the
American Revolution. P. KIENEL, supra note 20, at 96. Until the 1976 amendments to FUTA,
Christian schools had been entirely exempt from the payment of unemployment taxes. See note
108 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, throughout American history, Christian schools
have been granted tax-exempt status by both federal and state governments. See Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676-78 (1970). Therefore, in considering the history and tradition of
Christian schools and the long-established national policy of not taxing religious organizations, it
is submitted that the Supreme Court would follow its precedent in Yoder and strike a free
exercise balance in favor of the schools. Indeed, the one lower court case which has addressed
the free exercise issue held that the imposition of Tennessee's unemployment compensation
statute on Christian schools violated the schools' first amendment, free exercise rights. Inde-
pendent Baptist Church v. Tennessee, No. 54227, slip op. at 6-9 (Ch. Ct. of Hamilton County,
Tenn. Mar. 23, 1979) (unpublished opinion).
364. For an explanation of the excessive entanglement factor, see notes 292-96 and accom-
panying text supra.
365. See notes 334-39 & 343 and accompanying text supra.
366. See notes 96-100 and accompanying text supra.
367. See notes 335-36 and accompanying text supra.
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when a Christian school employee is laid off and seeks benefits, the state
will be required to scrutinize the decision of the school to determine
whether the decision to fire or leave was justified under the "good cause"
standard. 368  It is thus suggested that the Grace Brethren court correctly
found that governmental oversight of the reasons for Christian school
employee terminations has become "far more intrusive than that [involved
in] Catholic Bishop. . . . [CIlearly ...unconstitutional entanglement ... is
occurring on a regular basis." 3 69
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is submitted that the application of
the unemployment compensation laws to Christian schools violates their first
amendment free exercise rights, both on the basis of the Yoder "substantial
burdening" analysis and on the basis of the Court's "excessive entanglement"
factor.
V. CONCLUSION
The powerful economic interests involved in the expansion of un-
employment compensation coverage370 have collided head-on with the
weighty religious free exercise claims of the rapidly expanding Christian
schools. 3 7 1 In resolving this conflict, it is not the position of this comment
that Christian schools should ignore the needs of their past, present, or fu-
ture employees. Rather, it is suggested that subjecting Christian schools to
the unemployment compensation laws is 1) unpragmatic, in light of the ex-
panding levels of employment in the schools; 372 2) not statutorily mandated,
in view of the section 3301(b)(1) exception to FUTA 3 7 3 and in the absence of
a clear congressional intent to subject Christian schools to these laws; 374 and
3) unconstitutional, based on the Yoder analysis of the free exercise
clause.3 75 Finally, it is submitted that although the ideals behind the un-
employment compensation laws are undeniably laudable,3 76 governmental
enforcement of such laws, in the context of Christian schools, should only be
368. For a discussion of the "good cause" eligibility requirement for unemployment compen-
sation benefits, see notes 101-07, 215 & 343 and accompanying text supra.
369. Grace Brethren Church v. California, Nos. CV 79-93 MRP, CV 79-162 MRP, slip op. at
13 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1979).
370. Regarding the socio-economic policies behind expanding the unemployment compensa-
tion laws, see notes 53-56 and accompanying text supra.
371. See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra.
372. See notes 354-55 and accompanying text supra.
373. For a discussion of the § 3309(b)(1) exception to FUTA, see notes 175-201 and accom-
panying text supra.
374. For a discussion of the lack of explicit congressional intent to include Christian schools
in the federal-state unemployment compensation program, see notes 202-52 and accompanying
text supra.
375. For a discussion of the Yoder Court's three-tiered analysis of free exercise rights, see
notes 259-70 & 281-91 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the constitutionality of
the unemployment compensation laws as applied to Christian schools, see notes 310-69 and
accompanying text supra.
376. See notes 53-56 and accompanying text supra.
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resorted to in extraordinary situations.3 77  Churches have their own
mechanisms for caring for their unemployed and providing them with new
jobs. 378  Religious organizations have often been in the vanguard of those
who seek affirmative social change in America.3 79  It is submitted that, in
view of the fact that no weighty governmental interests will be jeopar-
dized,3 80 Christian schools should continue to be excluded from coverage
under the unemployment compensation laws.
R. Leonard Davis III
377. One such extraordinary situation might arise if massive unemployment existed among
Christian school teachers and the schools themselves were incapable of ameliorating the situa-
tion. Presently, however, there is no indication that unemployment levels are high among
Christian school teachers. See notes 354-55 and accompanying text supra.
378. See generally B. COUGHLIN, CHURCH AND STATE IN SOCIAL WELFARE 104-26, 129
(1965).
379. See generally S. EISENSTADT, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND MODERNIZATION (1968);
G. LENSKI, THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGIOUS IMPACT ON POLI-
TICS, ECONOMICS, AND FAMILY LIFE 309-21 (1961); H. MARTIN, CHRISTIAN SOCIAL REFORM-
ERS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1927); K. SILVERT, CHURCHES AND STATES: THE RE-
LICIOUS INSTITUTION AND MODERNIZATION (1967).
380. For a discussion of the weighing process utilized by the Court to adjudicate constitu-
tional claims when religious and governmental values conflict, see notes 281-91 and accompany-
ing text supra.
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